Civilization and its Conceptualizations in Ethnology, Social Anthropology, and Sociology[1]

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Abstract: Part of this paper was written as the "Presentation of the Theme" at the academic forum "Cross-Civilization Interactions: The Perspective of Chinese Ethnology" held by the Ethnology and Sociology Institute of Xinjiang Normal University on 18-21 November 2013, while the rest of its content was presented as a lecture with the same title at the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences on 15 April 2014. This paper looks at the different definitions of the concept of civilization in Western learning in an historical and archaeological context, especially the two definitions of "single or multiple" civilizations that emerged in the 18th and 19th century, and how ethnology, social anthropology, and sociology wavered between them a hundred years later. The aim of this article is to sort out the history of a pre-existent concept; however, this does not mean only summarizing the history, which hardly contains the author's interpretive orientation. Borrowing from this configuration, I define civilization as a supra-societal system, also providing a further explanation of what a supra-social system is, while also implicitly pointing out that, since supra-social systems are part of all societies, the nationalities face a double issue – their relationship with the regional and world systems beyond them, and their relationship with the civilization intrinsic to but as well beyond them, which represent a heavy burden for them.

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1.

The term civilization covers more than most ancient communities and modern nationalities (it often corresponds to the entities represented by the concepts of society, culture, and "people"), and is not the same as a "world system". Civilizations "extend beyond the territory of any single nation, or they develop over periods of time exceeding the history of any single society."[2] Nevertheless, this kind of entities is not unrelated to society, as they often are "absorbed" by each society and are interweaved with different societies, becoming the result of the relations between different societies.[3] Even though people think of society or a country as a fixed territory, the civilization of a nationality is always active inside and outside borders. The "activity" of civilization going beyond boundaries is sometimes related to military conquests, however the reason why scholars use civilization to describe this type of supra-societal entities is precisely because they are different from empires (some civilizations became the cultural basis of empires, others became knowledge or religions shared by different kingdoms, being instrumental in uniting or dividing different kingdoms), because they were not formed through military power, but through technology, mythology or religion, and knowledge. Civilizations often emerge from a situation of "current customs", in contrast with "non-civilized" formations, probably rejecting other entities and thus meeting the opposition of the latter, or having an imperceptible influence on or being followed by the latter.

2.

As the cradle of civilization, the Eurasia was the place where civilizations coexisted and interacted. The geographical distributions of civilizations in this area was equivalent to what Max Müller (1823-1900) defined as "dialectical regions". According to Müller, this was the earliest stage of the differentiation of human languages, the result of language differentiation before the rise of "nations" (back then Müller still believed that "linguistic stages", in the passage from the phase of mythology, at the dawn of history, had entered the "phase of nations"; however, one century later, scholars would mostly associate "nations" with the social changes that took place in Europe during the 18th century). Müller divided Eurasia into three main linguistic areas: Indo-European languages (Teutonic or Germanic, Celtic, Italic, Hellenic, Indo-Iranian), Semitic languages (Arabic, Aramaic, Hebrew), and Turanian languages. The latter are "languages" other than Indo-European and Semitic; the term Turanian originally meant "nomadic", and

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[2] 莫斯、涂尔干、于贝尔：《论技术、技艺与文明》，蒙养山人译、罗杨校，37页，北京: 世界图书出版公司, 2010. [Marcel Mauss, Émile Durkheim, Henri Hubert, edited by Nathan Schlanger, *Techniques, technology and civilization*, Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2006, p. 36].

[3] *Ibid.*, in Chinese p.38 [in English p.37].

its wider connotation is close to Owen Lattimore's (1900-1989) investigation on the scope of historical geography[4], while Müller's distribution is "scattered from China to the Pyrenees, from Cape Comorin, across the Caucasus, to Lapland"). Müller believed that these three linguistic and cultural areas predated "nations".[5]

In 19th century evolutionary anthropology Müller's three "dialectical areas" were essentially inserted in the discussion on "archaic society".

Evolutionary anthropology maintained a kind of old-style "theory of the three circles"[6], which said that human history went from primitive to archaic, to political civilization. This was both a temporal and spatial process: the primitive stage was the farthest from Europe, while archaic civilizations had a dual relation to Europe, because they were different from it, while also including ancient Europe. Evolutionary anthropology defines civilization as a religious, militarized, and citizenized social formation not dependent on blood ties that emerged after primitive societies. Under this definition, the whole of humanity has the potential for civilization, and the reason why Europe entered the stage of civilization first was that during specific phases of history (such as Ancient Greece and ancient Rome), innovations incidentally or naturally happened in Europe that did not take place in other regions.

At the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century, this idea of history as progress being gradually driven forward from the outside and the inside was criticized by diffusionists. Scholars supporting this standpoint believed that progress was not the key of history, and that archaic societies was somewhere in-between the European self and otherness. Its civilizations matured the earliest, and were much more brilliant than primitive and modern European cultures. The "middle circle" represented by archaic societies were the source of civilization in the European "core circle" and primitive "external circle" was imagined by evolutionary anthropology.

In the early 20th century, anthropologist Franz Boas (1958-1942) would interchangeably use the concepts civilization and culture, often describing "primitive cultures" as "other civilizations".[7] After WWI, this trend was further strengthened among anthropologists. During that period, social anthropologists, following

[4] 拉铁摩尔:《中国的亚洲内陆边疆》, 唐晓峰译, 南京: 江苏人民出版社, 2005 [Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China,* New York: American Geographical Society, 1940].

[5] 穆勒:《比较神话学》, 金泽译, 上海: 上海文艺出版社, 1989, 9页 [Max Müller, *Comparative Mythology: an essay*, edited by A. Smythe Palmer, Kessinger Publishing, 2003, p. 11].

[6] 王铭铭: "三圈说: 另一种世界观, 另一种社会科学",《西北民族研究》2013年第1期, 页 82-89. [WANG Mingming, "The Theory of the Three Rings: Alternative Worldviews, Alternative Social Sciences", *Northwestern Journal of Ethnology*, 2013, Vol. 1, pp. 82-89].

[7] Author's note: In 1907 Franz Boas emphasized in one of his speeches that "Anthropology teaches better than any other science the relativity of the values of civilization." (Franz Boas, *A Franz Boas Reader: The Shaping of American Anthropology, 1883-1911*, edited by George Stocking Jr., p.280, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974); even though he was also talking about ancient civilizations, he was mostly referring to the civilizations of primitive men, who were different from the men who came after them, indicating what modern American cultural anthropology defined as "cultures" under his lead.

Bronislaw Malinkowski (1884-1942), A. R. Radcliffe-Brown (1881-1955), E.E. Evans-Pritchard (1902-1973), and so on, were introduced to "tribal societies". For a while the study of "simple societies" became fashionable in academia, and the canonical examples of these societies (Malinowski's Trobriand Islands, Radcliffe-Brown's Andaman Islands, and Evans-Pritchard's Nuer[8]) were all located outside the Eurasian continent, either in Oceania or in Africa. Anthropologists asserted that those social organizations adapted to ecology, embedded in life and economically and naturally formed were in contrast with the "complex societies" of Eurasia, characterized by a greater scale, a more complicated structure and a high degree of centralized power. The society of the Nuer people as described by Evans-Pritchard could be considered to be the opposite of the nation described by Hegel. Hegel believed that binding mechanisms related to a nation were not shackles of "freedom", since "We should on the contrary look upon such limitation as the indispensable proviso of emancipation."[9]. Contrary to Hegel, Evans-Pritchard's description of Nuer society was only apparently similar to the realization of a "free" society as imagined by Hegel, but in reality, it was its polar opposite. Hegel's "nation" was the "only civilization", it was the idea of a spiritual nation, the reflection in the background of the real nation, the realization of an ethical concept, absolutely rational. In this sense, there is a clear distinction between "nation" and society, since Hegel believed that society was an "external nation", the combination of subjective will and individual benefits, while the nation had a supreme will and an ethical spirit, which are condensed in the organic entity of a nation, and are the preconditions that determine the shape of other societies. Opposite to Hegel's "nation", the formation of the society of the Nuer people had no relation to spirit and ethics, but it adapted itself to the rhythms of nature, the traditional system of kinship and geographical relations, and the lines of the life cycle. It has nothing to do with "free will", but is a dynamic system of integration and differentiation, which naturally adjusts itself to social life, thus becoming full of vitality. If we must say that the society of the Nuer people is close to "freedom", then this "freedom" has absolutely nothing to do with the idea of "nation" conceived by Hegel.

Under the lead of Evans-Pritchard, marked by the book *African Political Systems*[10], British anthropologists immersed themselves in African studies, regarding the alternative African-style political systems as the "other lens" through

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[8] Author's note: 对这些著作的述评，见王铭铭主编:《20世纪西方人类学主要著作指南》，39-46页; 47-52页; 133-137页，北京: 世界图书出版公司，2008 [For a commentary on these books see WANG Mingming, ed., *A Guide to the Main Works of Western Anthropology in the 20th Century* (*20 shiji xifang renleixue zhuyao zhinan*), pp. 39-46; pp. 47-52; pp. 133-137, Beijing: World Publishing Corporation, 2008].

[9] 格尔:《历史哲学》，王造时译，43页，上海: 上海书店出版社，1999 [Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, the Philosophy of History, Translated by J. Sibree, M.A, Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001, p. 56].

[10] Meyer Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard eds., *African Political Systems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1940.

which to look at the notion of enlightenment and the "political civilizations" of the 19th century. Thus, they also advocated that the unrest of the 20th century was to be traced back to the theories of European Enlightenment and civilization.

Starting from the mid-1920s, French sociological Annales School established its own Institute of Ethnology, and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857-1939), who held the position of head of the Institute, gave a lot of importance to the study of primitive mentality. In his *La mentalité primitive*, published in 1922, he suggested that for primitive human beings there was a mysterious, close, and mutual relation with the spiritual world, and the way primitive men saw the world was different from the logical thinking of civilized men.[11] Lévy-Bruhl's writings deeply influenced Evans-Pritchard's later research, and although the latter did not endorse the practice of differentiating between civilizations and things other than civilization on the basis of logic and non-logic, under the conceptual framework established by this categorization he emphasized the importance of the logical thinking of non-civilized societies for the theoretical investigations of social anthropology.[12]

This did not mean that anthropologists did not study civilization; on the contrary, by participating in "uncivilized societies", they sought other civilizations (small-scale communities and their cultural patterns) outside the civilizations they lived in. They could look at the "intrinsic barbarism" of Europe between the two wars through the lens of these "alternative civilizations". According to them, the so-called "uncivilized nations", who did not have a written language, and had a society without having a nation, were "civilizations outside of civilization". By devoting themselves to constructing a clear image of these "civilizations outside of civilization", anthropologists took on the trend of separating "uncivilized nationalities" from the civilizations of the Eurasian continent. Nonetheless, the concepts and theories they used would often come from the research on the system of Indo-European and Semitic civilizations – for example, both political anthropology and anthropology of religion would rely on the proposition from Müller's studies on Indo-European mythologies and religions, as well as the social theory developed by Robertson Smith (1846-1894) in the field of Arab-Semitic totems and sacrificial rituals.[13]

3.

However, the preconditions for rethinking civilizations were not necessarily the "alternative to civilization" sought by social anthropologists. It was precisely when the gaze of social anthropologists drifted away from the Eurasian continent, that several historians decided to go back to it, regarding in-between civilizations as

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[11] 列维-布留尔：《原始思维》，丁由译，北京：商务印书馆，1981 [Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Primitive mentality, translated by Lilian A. Clare, London ： New York ： George Allen & Unwin ltd; Macmillan Company, 1923].

[12] E.E. Evans-Pritchard, *Theories of Primitive Religion*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965.

[13] E.E. Evans-Pritchard, *A History of Anthropological Thought*, pp.69-81, New York: Basic Books 1981.

research units, and confronting themselves with the rise and fall of Western civilizations, as well as with their future. Among them, there were distinguished scholars like Oswald Spengler (1880-1936) who published in 1918 his *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (*The Decline of the West*),[14] in which he made the distinction between eight civilization systems to recount the history of the world and the rise and fall of the West as a part of it, or like Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975), who in 1922 started planning his *A Study of History*[15], in which he advocated that civilization went beyond nation, and he claimed that there had been a small number of creative elite leaders who were crucial for the rise of their civilization: when they ceased to respond creatively to the problems of their times, the civilization would start declining. Toynbee's research on civilization even reached the same conclusion as Evans-Pritchard's study on comparative political systems: the tyranny of nationalism, militarism and autocracy would inevitably cause a civilization to perish.[16]

Popular historians like Spengler and Toynbee were disdained by the anthropological world. For example, Marcel Mauss (1872-1950), by including the "three rings" of primitive, archaic and modern history in comparative ethnology, paid particular attention to "archaic society" that acted as a middle link between ancient and modern times (that is, civilization in the definition of linguists, ethnologists and sociologists). Mauss acknowledged the "value" of the writings of scholars such as Spengler as "heuristic". However, he would also criticize them by calling them "historical atlases of civilizations". His criticism of Spengler was even more straightforward: Mauss said that his morphological study of civilizations was "literacy", and that "These moral classifications of civilizations and nations into hard and soft, into organic and loose, together with this philosophy of history with its vast and colossal considerations, are really of value only to the general public. It is a regression devoid of any precision into the antiquated formulae of 'cultural destinies', 'historic missions', into the whole jargon of this unconscious sociology that encumbers vulgar history and reaches even the self-styled social science of political parties. The sociologists would truly find more ideas and facts in Guizot… If here again morphology must be separated from the simple cartography of areas and layers of distribution of objects. etc., if it is guided by the a priori ideas of "the culture" or of a priori defined 'such and such cultures'.'"[17]

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[14] 斯宾格勒:《西方的没落》, 齐世荣、田农译, 北京: 商务印书馆, 2001 [Oswald Spengler, *The decline of the West*, translated by Charles Francis Atkinson, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991].

[15] 汤恩比:《历史研究》, 陈晓林译, 台北: 桂冠图书股份有限公司, 1978 [Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, London: Oxford University Press, 1960].

[16] Author's note: Even though this kind of viewpoints did not come from diffusionist anthropology, this is still valid, since the supporters of these standpoints believe civilization to be great cultural systems realized throughout history, that are often incomparable with modern times because of unfortunate reasons.

[17] 莫斯、涂尔干、于贝尔:《论技术、技艺与文明》, 第67页 [Mauss, Durkheim, Hubert, *Techniques, Technology and Civilization*, p. 66].

Still, there were also important scholars with opposite views. For example, Berkeley cultural anthropologist Alfred Kroeber was greatly inspired by morphological studies of civilizations, and he applied this methodology in his monumental *Configurations of Cultural Growth*[18]. In his writings on civilization, Kroeber claimed that "The two Spenglerian principles with which this study is, then, in essential accord are, first, the existence of certain fundamental patterns characteristics of each major culture, and second, that these occur in limited growths."[19]. In the introduction to this book, Kroeber also spent a lot of words expounding a concept of "talent" that was like Toynbee's, describing the challenges that the research of these people was posing to cultural anthropology.[20]

Under the dominance of the concepts of cultural relativism, other members of the American school of cultural anthropology would show contempt for the studies of civilizations. This situation lasted nearly until the 1950s, when neo-evolutionary anthropology emerged, and cultural anthropology saw a resurgence of interest in ancient history, and started retelling the different standpoints raised by evolutionary anthropology and diffusionist anthropology of the 19th century. During this time, Australian-born archaeologist with British descent Gordon Childe (1892-1957), at times considered to be part of the new neo-evolutionary anthropology, clearly defined the categories of civilization, and investigated the mechanisms of its origins.

Gordon Childe (1892-1957)

The impression that Müller's treatise made on others was the idea that "dialectical areas", as the foundation of the civilization system, preceded the emergence of "nations" founded by heroes, and that the age when they were formed was later called "prehistory" by scholars. Even though Childe would also stress

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[18] Alfred Kroeber, *Configurations of Culture Growth*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 828.

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 7-16.

that civilization was born from the food production (agriculture) revolution and the culture of soil in a new era, its growth happened "after prehistory (Bronze Age)". Childe believed civilization to be the result of the urban revolution. The urban revolution probably took place 5,000 years ago, and it first happened in Mesopotamia, and later in Egypt, in the Indus Valley, and in the northern regions of China. We already know that the earliest urban centers in the Americas appeared around 1000 BC, in Central America and Peru. Childe thought that civilization had a number of characteristics. Civilization was both based on highly developed agriculture, and it also represented a revolution for the countryside. The rise of civilization was marked by the emergence of mature cities. After the appearance of cities, political structures, as well as production and exchange structures, became more complex compared to Neolithic village societies. Being influenced by Durkheim's sociological thought, Childe viewed civilization as society in its strictest sense, believing civilization to have a higher degree of social cohesion than Neolithic village communities: "Peasants, craftsmen, priests and rulers form a community, only by reason of identity of language and belief, but also because each performs mutually complementary functions, needed for the well-being (as redefined under civilization) of the whole."[21]. Furthermore, one of the important characteristics of civilization was due to the presence of a written language, temples and a calendar system, which clearly separate civilized societies from primitive tribes and village communities.[22] Although the rise of civilizations would always follow the expansion of the city's control to "barbaric" areas, Childe would insist that the relationship between civilized and barbaric regions was characterized by exchanges: "The Egyptians, the Sumerians and the Indus people had accumulated vast reserves of surplus food. As the same time they had to import form abroad necessary raw materials like mental and building timber as well as "luxurics." Communities controlling these natural resources could in exchange claim a slice of the urban surplus. They could use it as capital to support full-time specialists—craftsmen or rulers—until the latter's achievement in technique and organization had so enriched barbarian economies that they too could produce a substantial surplus in their return."[23].

Linking civilization to the urban revolution led scholars to give unprecedented importance to the study of urban architecture. For example, Lewis Mumford (1895-1990), who supported the theory of the urban revolution, explained more systematically than Childe that the kinship and religions displayed by huge public buildings, the classes originating from the differentiation of architectural scale and shape, and the kingdoms' control of public utilities emerging from canals, city walls and other public facilities,. Mumford's research showed that civilization was the process of village culture gradually giving way to urban civilization.[24]

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[21] Gordon Childe, "The urban revolution", *Town Planning Review*, Vol.21, Issue 1, p.16, 1950.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 12-16.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[24] 芒福德：《城市发展史——起源、演变和前景》，倪文彦，宋俊岭译，北京：中国建筑工业出

The geographical distribution in earliest stages of civilization took shape very early, but the notion of civilization truly reflects its close relationship with the cities that could disseminate their "current customs". Therefore, civilizations acquired meaning through their differentiation from uncivilized people (*yi* in Chinese, "alterity", "barbarian", "savage" in the West), indicating the differences between the people who lived within a civilization and the ones living outside the influence of civilization (especially those who lived outside the cities). Thus, it is easy to understand how the word civilization came from the Latin *civilis*, which meant "civil", and was connected to the Latin word *civis* ("citizen"), as well as to *civitas* ("city" or "city-state").[25]

The earliest centers of civilizations in the Old World
(the key areas were Mesopotamia and Egypt)[26]

The civilization studies of the urban revolution theory were deeply influenced by 19th century evolutionary anthropologist Lewis Henry Morgan (1818-1881)[27], however this theory revealed to us a picture of "constellations" formed by

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版社, 1989 [Lewis Mumford, The city in history : its origins, its transformations, and its prospects, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966].

[25] 威廉斯:《关键词》, 刘建基译, 46页, 北京: 三联书店, 2005. [Raymond Williams, *Keywords*, London: Fontana Paperbacks, 1983, p.57].

[26] Gordon Childe, "The urban revolution", p.8.

[27] 王铭铭:《裂缝间的桥——解读摩尔根<古代社会>》, 济南: 山东人民出版社, 2004 [WANG Mingming, *Bridging the Fracture: An Interpretation of Morgan's 'Ancient Society'* (*Liefeng jian de qiao: jiedu Mo'ergen gudai 'shehui'*), Jinan: Shandong People's Publishing House, 2004].

civilizations, and their supporters claimed to be looking for the different sources of civilization achievements all over the world.

4.

The urban revolution theory is an interpretation of history as rupture, and its intent is to emphasize the great changes in the life of humans during the Bronze Age. This interpretation was questioned by scholars who supported a vision of history as continuity. For instance, Kwang-chih Chang, who focused on the study of the Shang civilization in ancient Chinese history, believed that this civilization continued the shamanic tradition that came before[28]; among earlier scholars we find Marcel Granet, who dedicated himself to the research of the Zhou civilization and its continuous influence, and thought that the Zhou preserved the traditions of the previous farming and primitive kinship system, as well as seasonal social activities[29]. The points of view raised by Chang and Granet can be said to be "vertical" cosmology and "horizontal" cosmology, with the former giving importance to the investigation of top to bottom relations with the king and shamans as the principal axis, and the latter focusing on the study of the internal and external relations formed in the system of ceremonial social relationships. If we were to integrate both of their ideas, we would reach the following conclusions: (1) both vertical and horizontal relations took shape before the Bronze Age; (2) in the different dynasties of the Bronze Age there were different types of relations, with the Shang giving priority to vertical ones, and the Zhou preferring horizontal ones, thus forming clear-cut civilization characteristics for each dynasty; (3) the civilization characteristics of ancient dynasties were intertwined with different types, and this went through a process of historical accumulation, up until later generations (for example, during the period of Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty), evolving into a "comprehensive pattern"[30].

The East is only one of the three main "dialectical regions" of Eurasia identified by Müller. When he created his theory of the three Eurasian regions, Müller had the tendency to regard Europe and India as belonging to the same whole: in his writing, ancient India was both the mother of European civilization (from the records in Sanskrit of that civilization we can gain an understanding of the ancient European civilization), and the "infancy era" of European civilization (pre-modern Indian civilization represents the childhood of European civilization). Müller would categorize Semitic and East Asian civilizations as being extremely distant from European civilizations. Being one of the civilizations farthest from the European civilizations, he would give importance to Chinese civilizations, be it the one

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[28] 张光直：《商文明》，沈阳：辽宁教育出版社，2002 [Kwang-chih Chang, *Shang Civilization* Yale University Press, 1982].

[29] Marcel Granet, *Chinese Civilization*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1930.

[30] WANG Mingming, "Directions, seasons, and alterities: notes on the early history of Chinese political cosmology, *The Journal of the Traditional Cosmology Society*, Volume 29, pp.25-58, 2013.

of the Shang or the Zhou, since they were all opposite to European civilizations. However, this did not mean that something that comes from a distant civilization is completely unrelated from one's own civilization: even though, as Childe pointed out, civilization was to be understood as the great changes in social life that took place after the urban revolution, civilization was common in the continuity of "pre-civilizations" (especially in the continuity of the civilizations of the three major "linguistic regions" identified by Müller).

5.

In the 1960s, Fernard Braudel (1902-1985), one of the leaders of the French Annales School, after completing a history of the world centered on the Mediterranean, wrote *A History of Civilizations* (*Grammaire des civilisations*), presenting history with civilizations and non-civilizations often focusing on global political and economic systems as a unit. Braudel borrowed from the traditional division between non-European civilizations (the Islamic and Muslim world, Africa, the Far East, etc.), and European civilizations (Europe, the Americas, and "another Europe", including Eastern Europe and Russia). By comparing European and non-European civilizations, Braudel reached the following conclusion: "Since the development of Greek thought, however, the tendency of Western civilization has been towards rationalism and hence away from the religious life… With very few exceptions (certainly Chinese sophists, and certain Arab philosophers in the twelfth century), no such marked turning away from religion is to be found in the history of the world outside the West."[31].

Many years before Braudel, in 1897, Max Weber (1864-1920) in the book *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations* (*Die sozialen Gründe des Untergangs der antiken Kultur*), divided the Eurasian continent into Eastern and Western parts. In the opening of the book he also suggested that Western agriculture went from animal husbandry to relying mainly on farming, and animal husbandry became auxiliary, while on the other hand, the opposite happened in the Eastern part: they also went from husbandry to farming, but they did not retain the tradition of producing dairy products from livestock. The two agricultural traditions led Eastern and Western cultures on two completely different paths: (1) the West formed a tradition of dividing common land into pieces of private land, which did not happen in the East; (2) even in terms of commonly owned land, the West and the East had different positions; (3) the West had "individualism" related to the individual ownership of livestock, which was missing in the East, and so on[32].

The categorization into Eastern and Western civilizations was endowed with a sort of "Oriental definition". Japanese ethnologist Tadao Umesao (1920-2010) in the 1950s and 1960s published an historical essay on the ecology of civiliza-

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[31] 布罗代尔:《文明史纲》, 肖昶等译, 桂林: 广西师范大学出版社, 1987, 43页 [Fernand Braudel, *A History of Civilization*, translated by Richard Mayne, New York: Penguin Books, 1994, p. 23].

[32] Max Weber, *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations*, trans. R.I. Frank, p.37, London: Verso, 2013.

tions, representative of his post-War ethnological ideas, where he rethought the division between East and West, and he differentiated Eurasia into two regions, the first consisting of Western Europe and Japan, which saw the rise of capitalistic and democratic civilisations, and the second one including China, India, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia, which were empires with satellite states.

Umesao believed that because of "ecological" reasons, Zone One (the outer regions of the Eurasian continent) had taken a different path than Zone Two (the inland). He stated:

"The people of Zone One originated historically as groups of 'barbarians', or those outside the sphere of civilization. After absorbing civilization from Zone Two centers, these populations passed through stages of feudalism, absolutism, and bourgeois revolution. In the contemporary world, the nations of Zone One have achieved a high level of modern civilization, built upon a capitalist foundation. As for Zone Two, it was host to all of the major civilizations of antiquity. However, instead of a feudal period, the regions of Zone Two saw the development of vast despotic empires, which were riven by internal contradictions. Many areas of Zone Two eventually became colonies or quasi-colonies of Zone One countries. In recent years, the nations of Zone Two have experienced a series of revolutions, and at last attempting to follow a path toward a new kind of modernization."[33]

Tadao Umesao, the structure of Zones One and Two[34]

Umesao's theory of civilization very interestingly provides a picture of the history of the internal and external interactions between civilized and "non-civilized" areas, arguing that the reason why Zone One (the "barbarians") modernized

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[33] Tadao Umesao, *An Ecological View of History*, pp. 95-96.

[34] Author's note: Reproduction by the author of this paper of the original picture from Tadao Umesao, *An Ecological View of History: Japanese Civilization in the World Context*, p.96, Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2003.

earlier was because this region had a tradition of drawing from Zone Two (civilization), and the systems of government characteristic of Zone One (feudalism and absolutism) were a necessary condition and an explanation of modernization. In Umesao's view, the large-scale empires located in Zone Two did not allow the existence of the "subjectivity" of national cultures derived from the division of the feudal system, thus in the long term they fell into internal fights, and finally they could only follow the "barbaric" Zone One and become latecomers of modernization.

6.

Modern times saw the emergence of "world history" centered on Europe, or on Zone One, whose main point was otherwise seen as the globalization of the Hegelian "absolute reason", or as the continuation of the political and economic system (world system) of the relations between the so-called "feudalistic" and "absolutistic" modern sovereign countries and the "contracts" between them. Regardless of whether we are talking about Weber or Braudel in Europe, or Umesao in Japan, they all placed specialemphasis on Europe, or Zone One, as the moving force that led the entire world into modernity. Even so, civilizations in this stage between the national and world system continue to perform the role of structural factors of world history: even Braudel, who emphasized the specificity of the Mediterranean, acknowledged that "A civilization, then, is neither a given economy nor a given society, but something which can persist through a series of economies or societies, barely susceptible to gradual change."[35]

7.

In the modern conceptual world, all of the definitions of civilization are closely related to the double characteristics of rupture and continuity in the history of civilizations we have discussed above.

Starting from the end of the 18th century, *civilization* became a commonly used word, an uncountable noun indicating the process and establishment, with an emphasis on the self-development of humanity towards secularism and progress, "expressed this sense of historical process, but also celebrated the associated sense of modernity: an achieved condition of refinement and order. "[36]. In this sense, we have both the verb *civilize* and the noun *civilization*, that is the result of civilize: these words were widely used by French and Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, who represented the Modernist movement, indicating progress and Enlightenment of the ruptured relationship with tradition.

During the 19th century, the uncountable idea of civilization was linked with the view of social Darwinism on cultural levels that started circulating more extensively among the social sciences. In the late 19th century, the concept of uncountable civilization arrived to Eastern Asia, where it was met with favor by

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[35] 布罗代尔：《文明史纲》, 35页 [Braudel, *Grammaire des civilizations*, p.35].
[36] 威廉斯：《关键词》, 58页 [Williams, *Keywords*].

intellectuals. For example, Japanese scholar Fuzukawa Yukichi (1835-1901) in his *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization*, published in 1875, translated the word *wenming* 文明 used in the *Book of Changes* as *civilization*, making a statement that civilization is improved by knowledge and education. This "translation of *wenming*" was introduced in China at the end of the 19th century.[37]

At the same time, stating from the end of the 18th century, the word *civilization* was also used in its plural form, *civilizations* (*zhu wenming* 诸文明), and it was used to indicate something similar to *cultures*, defined as all those things that constitute the ways of life of a nation, like art, customs and habits, faith, values, behaviors, and material life. This emerged at the same time as the definition of uncountable civilization and civilization changed to signify also something different from the betterment of a state or the pursuit of progress, also meaning a rather hopeless phase of development from continuous unity of nature, culture and society.[38] For instance, Rousseau would differentiate between civilization and culture, believing that compared to culture, civilization meant a more rationalized and socialized order, different from the original concept of culture of his generation. Rousseau's ideal realm was a return to a pre-linguistic, pre-rational human consistency. He defined human consistency as culture, represented by the "noble savage"; thus, being civilized started to indicate also the exacerbation of human inequality and the splitting of the ego. After Rousseau, German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) and other Romantic thinkers defined the plural noun *cultures* as the "pre-rational *Volkgeist*, or national spirit", attacking the hypocrisy of the aristocratic theory of civilization, and claiming that different nations in different periods had different cultures, which were not the same thing as the systems of the *Volksgeist* corresponding to a nationality, or the civilizations of rationalism and industrialism.[39] Furthermore, Herder arrived at a complete view of history, which "rejected the Enlightenment movement", and unlike the latter, it adopted relativist ethical values towards civilizations.

The standpoint of Rousseau and Herder had a long-lasting impact on sociology and ethnology. German sociology established the superiority of the idea of culture (*kultur*), leaning towards the belief that civilization indicated a series of ways of acting in response to nature, such as pragmatic technology, while culture was a set of standard principles, values and ideals worth investigating (Braudel: 25). In France, Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908-2009), the most prominent sociologist of the 20th century, would instead define society, culture and nature as the main objects of investigation of anthropology. Lévi-Strauss believed that Rousseau warned Western people about that the primitive people avoided the unbearable

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[37] 兴涛："晚清民初现代'文明'和'文化'概念的形成及其历史实践"，载于《近代史研究》2006 年第6期 [HUANG Xingtao, "The Formation of the Modern Concepts of 'Civilization' and 'Culture' and Their Historical Practice in Late Qing and Early Republican China", published in *Modern Chinese History Studies*, 2006 (6), pp. 6-8].

[38] Isaiah Berlin, *Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Harmann, Herder*, London: Pimlico, 2000.

[39] 威廉斯：《关键词》，89-91页 [Williams, *Keywords*, pp. 88- 90].

contradictions intrinsic to civilization Continuing Rousseau's idea, Lévi-Strauss thought that the mission of anthropology lay in making the human spirit return to culture, in other words, in the connection between society and nature. [40]

Even though the majority of anthropological researchers hold different views than Lévi-Strauss, almost every anthropologist dismisses the idea of civilization that was so popular in the evolutionary and diffusionist anthropology of the 19th century, and looking at the history of this discipline from another point of view, they always stand on the side of concepts like culture and society (this concept indicates something corresponding to the geographical category of nation), while criticizing concepts like civilization.[41]

People reacting to the idea of civilization like Rousseau and Herder led to the propagation of a great number of populist ideas of nation, society, ideology, and so on, centered on culture; up until the late 20th century, the habit in anthropology and sociology of comparing civilization to "cannibalistic ethics" is still more easily accepted by scholars. Norbert Elias (1897-1990) is an example. This German scholar, from the 1930s until his death, dedicated himself to the revival of the uncountable concept of civilization. In an interview Elias stated that Germans were accustomed to using the idea of culture, and even though people at court would speak French to express their elegance, they would not absorb the civilized demeanor of the aristocracy, therefore, in modern history Germany was unable to break through the boundary between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, unlike the French who, because of the idea of civilization they were used to, were able to overcome this boundary more easily, pushing aristocratic customs to the court and society, which enabled modern France being more moderate than modern Germany.[42]

8.

So, is civilization ultimately tradition or modernization? This question is embodied in the numerous and complex definitions of civilization in modern Europe. Those who see civilization as an uncountable process and accomplishment, think that there is one civilization, believing civilization to be a process and achievement of modern times; those who see civilization as a countable entity, believe in the existence of numerous civilizations, and consider different civilizations to be different traditions.

However, since the 20th century, there have been many people who have combined these two visions of civilization, of one civilization or multiple civilizations. Among them, we find Robert Redfield (1897-1958), anthropologist of the University of Chicago, who worked for the application of anthropology to socio-

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[40] 列维-斯特劳斯："让-雅克·卢梭：人的科学的奠基人",《结构人类学》第二卷, 俞宣孟等译, 38-49页, 上海: 上海译文出版社, 1999 [Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology*, New York: Basic Books, 1996].

[41] For example, George Stocking Jr., *Victorian Anthropology*, pp.8-45, New York: The Free Press, 1987.

[42] Norbert Elias, *Reflections on a Life,* p.57, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994.

logical issues. He proposed the theory of "great" and "little tradition", combining these two connotations of civilization.

Redfield's anthropological research is part of the Chicago school of sociology, which was focused on the study of urban human ecology[43]: his classic studies were carried out in the Mexican province of Yucatan, and the historical timeline he focused on was linked together by different locations, including tribes, villages, towns, and cities. In his opinion, if a sociologist studies history, they need to focus on the history of modernization, which is the evolution process of going from the little tradition of tribes and villages towards civilization (which was modernization in his definition). The essence of this process was the transformation to social individualization in the passage from village to city, which was rich in social connotations. The so-called "little tradition" really indicates another kind of life different from the individualized life in the cities, which is reflected in the outlook on life of villagers, referring to the culture's sense of organization and internally consistence and the integration of social factors in a sociological sense. Redfield defined "great tradition" as the modernity that formed in contrast to the "little tradition", characterized by cultural disorder, the domination of money economy, the disintegration of the family system, the decline of spiritual faith, the change from religious calendars to secular calendars, and the replacement of shamanism with medicine. Redfield clearly thought that the word "civilization" could be used to describe the general characteristics of the modernization of the great tradition in terms of "personal behavior" – social individualization.[44]

Robert Redfield (1897-1958)

Starting from the 1950s, Redfield attempted to give a better and more general definition of great and little tradition, putting forward the idea that complex

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[43] 费孝通:《师承·补课·治学》，206-337页，北京: 三联书店，2001 [Fei Xiaotong, *Teachers, Lessons, Scholarship* (*Shicheng, buke, zhixue*), pp. 206-337, Beijing: Joint Publishing Company, 2001]

[44] Robert Redfield, *The Folk Culture of Yucatan*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941.

societies were divided into great and little traditions, where great traditions indicated high-level, classic, scholastic, hierarchical civilizations where a small number of people have proprietary rights, emblemized by the training provided by schools, temples and individuals. On the other hand, little traditions were low-level, folk, vulgar, non-specialized civilizations where things were shared by the majority, and where "culture" (village culture) was expressed in a non-written and non-conscious way.[45] While trying to perfect his definition of civilization, Redfield changed the way in which he previously directly equated civilization with modernization or social individualization, and started believing that all of the "agricultural societies" that existed through history were only "part societies", "parts of the whole of civilization"[46].

Redfield did not clearly differentiate between unitary and diverse civilizations, although by looking at his works we can see that the concept of civilization he adopted in his early studies referred to a modernity that was unifying the world, while later he used a concept of civilization that included both "primary civilization" and "secondary civilizations". The so-called "primary civilization" meant the civilized traditions existing in non-Western territories before they entered modernization, such as the Mayan civilization in Yucatan region, which he studied, the classic civilization transmitted by the Chinese gentry, the Indian civilization represented by the Vedas: these civilizations were the great traditions formed locally, before the arrival of the civilization of colonial modernization from the outside, which had already entered rural society, becoming part of the connotation of the life of villagers[47].

9.

Redfield's theory of civilization changed through time: in the early stages he influenced the study of modernization of many anthropologists, while later on he inspired a great number of scholars to conduct comparative research on the process of localization of civilizations all over the world. Seeing that historical civilizations appeared very early in non-Western rural societies, Redfield himself partially abandoned his early urban sociology, turning to the investigation of socio-ethnographical methodologies for the study of peasants, criticizing the fact that traditional ethnography was limited to the study of tribes, believing that it was necessary to transform this kind of methodology in order to properly describe peasant societies, and it was necessary to research the "local society" of peasant society as a civilized whole. Redfield called for the integration of ethnographical contextual research and the textual research of history, literature, religious studies, and philosophy. Other scholars, especially Indian and Southeastern studies specialists like McKim Marriot, redefined the concepts of great and little tradi-

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[45] Robert Redfield, *Peasant Society and Culture*, pp. 41-42, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956.

[46] *Ibid.*, pp. 23-39.

[47] *Ibid.*, pp. 40-59.

tion on the basis of the research on Indian civilization as universalization and parochialization respectively[48], and like Stanley Tambiah, who reinterpreted these ideas as the continuation and transformation of old and new religions[49]. There are also scholars who consider Redfield's theory of great and little tradition to be of little value, such as Louis Dumont (1911-1998), who believed that when it came to "village studies", it was not necessary to distinguish between great and little traditions, because these traditions are all part of peasant life, and cannot be differentiated[50].

Scholars like Redfield continued to dedicate themselves to the study of non-Western societies, and unlike previous anthropology, they thought that the passage from research on primitive tribal societies to the study of complex peasant societies was beneficial for widening of the field of view of the discipline. So-called "peasant societies" were subsequently defined as "locations of civilization", and these civilizations were also seen as the "primary civilization" which entered into "peasant societies" before modernization. Redfield did not personally provide a straightforward explanation of what kind of relationships were formed between "primary civilizations" and "secondary civilizations" of modern times during the process of modernization. However, he focused on the study of "little communities" as having both great and little traditions of traditional civilization, while firmly believing that this kind of little communities had the ability to organize great and little traditions; at the same time, he adopted a considerably critical attitude towards modernization, regarding it as "social individualization", and as already mentioned, "social individualization" implied the loss of those social structures and modes that made up tradition. This also meant that in Redfield's opinion, the modern relations between the civilizations of non-Western territories and the external civilizations coming from the West would always be characterized by conflict.

Fei Xiaotong, who was very close to Redfield, as early as in the late 1930s, started to focus on similar issues. Fei Xiaotong did not explicitly use the concepts of great and little tradition, however, he continued to be interested in the middle circle of Chinese society, the gentry, which played the role of promoting industrialization in the modernization process. In his views, the gentry, being between the high and low strata of society, had some kind of civilizational force, the ability to solve the contradiction between tradition and modernity from a local perspective[51]. The knowledge and experience acquired by anthropologists dedicated to

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[48] Mckim Marriott, "Little communities in an indigenous civilization", in M. Marriot ed. *Village India: Studies in the Little Community*, pp.171-222, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955.

[49] Stanley Tambiah, *Buddhism and the Spirit Cults in Northeast Thailand*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

[50] Louis Dumont, "The 'village community' from Munro to Maine", *Contributions to Indian Sociology 9*, pp. 67-89, 1966.

[51] 费孝通，吴晗：《皇权与绅权》，天津：天津人民出版社，1988；费孝通：《中国绅士》，惠海鸣译，北京：中国社会科学出版社，2006 [Hsiao-Tung Fei, *Peasant Life in China*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1939; Fei Xiaotong & Wu Han, *Imperial Power and Gentry Power* (*Huangquan yu shenquan*), Tianjin: Tianjin People Press, 1988; Fei Xiaotong, *China's Gentry*

the study of the Indian and Southeast Asian regions in their fieldwork did not reach the height of Fei Xiaotong's achievements on the gentry in China (including Fei's own position), but they conducted in-depth studies on rural religions. For instance, India specialists Dumont and Bernard Cohn (1928-2003) both put similar emphasis on religion as ideology. Dumont did not distinguish between great and little tradition, regarding the whole of Indian religions as an ideology that was both compatible and against Christianity and modernity[52]. On the other hand, Cohn, as part of the Chicago school of anthropology, was influenced by Redfield's theory of civilization, but he shifted his focus on the research of the relationships between colonialism and societies that had been studied, pointing out that societies like India had fought to break free from the British colonial influence, and the latter played a key role in the establishment of Indian polity and knowledge. Cohn's contribution to the study of what we call colonialism, or what Redfield had previously defined as modernization, consisted in both showing that "modernization" is a kind of power-knowledge system, as well as demonstrating the importance of researching the historical genealogy of this system[53]. This undoubtedly indicates that the study of the primary and secondary civilizations is also a study of internal and external relations. Relevant to this, anthropologist from the Chicago School Marshall Sahlins also never had a good opinion of the word *civilization*, because his main research object is non-Western island societies, thus it was easy for him to directly relate the concept of civilization to pre-modern Western "civilization propagation"; however, this successful anthropologist extended the alliance theory of structural anthropology to the study of cross-cultural relations, pointing out the idea of "structure of conjuncture", meaning that the "aboriginal" political cosmology was based on entering "localization" of the local "civilization" ("civilizations" of imperialism, colonialism)[54]. The idea of "structure of conjuncture" is in fact also a concept of the anthropology of civilization. Tambiah, an expert on Thailand, focuses on the overall study of Buddhism in Thailand, but his points of view are closer to Sahlins than Dumont and Cohn, since he has a more positive view of the dynamic structure of the political cosmology of Southeast Asian "primary civilizations", which in his definition were characterized by "galactic polity" (a concept similar to the analysis of the polity features for Zone Two brought forward by Japanese ethnologist Tadao Umesao), and this characteristic includes the ability of self-reproduction in the process of modernization[55].

Up until the early 1970s, anthropologists have either adopted a hierarchical interpretation (like Redfield, Cohn, Fei), or an integral interpretation (such

(*Zhongguo shenshi)*, trans. Hui Hai, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2006].

[52] Louis Dumont, *Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and Its Implications*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.

[53] Bernard Cohn, *The Bernard Cohn Omnibus*, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004.

[54] Marshall Sahlins, *Islands of History*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.

[55] Stanley Tambiah, *World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand against a Historical Background*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

as Dumont, Sahlins, Tambiah) for explaining the relation between historical and modern civilizations, also raising the need to "look at the process of modernization as envisaged by those engaged in it, in their cultural categories, world view and value system."[56]. However, since anthropologists have the habit to neglect the thinkers of the civilizations that have already been studied, they have not truly touched upon the relationship between the upper strata of a civilization, which are the core components of "primary civilizations", and modernization. Sociologist S. N. Eisenstadt (1923-2003) has instead carried out important research to complement this aspect. Eisenstadt, an Israeli sociologist, an important representative of neo-functionalism and of modernization theory, put forth a theory of multiple modernities based on the theory of the civilizations of the axial age. The idea of "civilizations of the axial age" was proposed by Karl Jaspers (1883-1969), a German psychoanalyst and philosopher, on the basis of Weber's historical studies. He argued that "great traditions" appeared in the period from 800 to 200 BC around the world, specifically the civilizations created by the great religious figures and philosophers in the Eurasian continent, including the philosophers in Greece, the prophets in Palestine, Zarathustra in Iran, who initiated Zoroastrianism, the Hundred Schools of Thought in China, Siddhartha in India. Evidently, the "civilizations of the axial age" were essentially the same as the "great traditions" emerging in civilized areas, some of which would emphasize the cultivation of religious transcendence, others the betterment of the realm of knowledge. Regardless of whether they influenced the area in which they emerged or the entire world, they established fundamental categories for human thought that are still valid to this day, founding the sources of world religions that humanity still relies upon. Therefore, it can be said that they even created a "spiritualized age" that made humanity aware of the existence of everything, of itself as well as its limits. In 2003 Eisenstadt published a collection of all his writings about the axial age and modernity[57], where he pointed out that the traditions of axial civilizations had a profound impact on the path to modernization, and thus they could lead to multiple futures of modernity. Taking on a Weberian point of view, Eisenstadt believed that compared to societies of civilization that did not exist during the axial age, the societies of civilization that did were noncongruent societies, where there was the historical existence of a clear division of labor and a distinct definition of elite functions[58]. Still, Eisenstadt also thought that each civilization of the axial age had its own characteristics, and brought different interpretations of the world and of humanity. These characteristics and interpretations had a long-lasting influence, and present us with the need to change the word "modernity" to its plural form. Eisenstadt opposed the tradition of the European exceptionality (which tends to attribute rationality and modernization to Europe), calling instead for multiple

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[56] Milton Singer, *When a Great Tradition Modernizes: An Approach to Indian Civilization*, p.384, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972.

[57] S.N. Eisenstadt, *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities*, Leiden: Brill, 2003.

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

civilizations and multiple modernities. Using the words of anthropologist James Clifford, in this interpretation "Tradition becomes a newly complex, open-ended, subject", turning into "unresolved and productive ways into our different, inter-connected futures "[59].

10.

According to Childe's overview of the distribution of ancient civilizations, the investigation of civilization of the Chicago School of anthropology, as well as the anthropologists related to it, started in Yucatan (the cradle of Mayan civilization) with Redfield's studies, then moved on to cover South Asia, the Middle East, East Asia, and Southeast Asia. Through special anthropological studies on civilization, the theoretical focus of this school from beginning was on modernization, and kept paying attention to it till the end, but from the late 1970s it started closely linking modernization with colonialism, imperialism, and nationalism, while also paying increasing attention to all those communities living in "primary" civilizations, as well as the force of continuing to exist underits politic-cosmological internal his-torical forceand under the pressure of external civilizations. Social anthropologist Eisenstadt, who dedicated himself to comparative civilization studies, started by placing particular emphasis on the philosophies, religions and institutional forms of the civilizations of the axial age, investigating multiple modernities: in his book *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities* he reaches the same conclu-sions of anthropology of civilization by using a different approach.

All these studies of civilization are ultimately confronted with the same ques-tions: were the differences existing between "primary" and "secondary" civiliza-tions preserved in the coming of "secondary" civilizations? Provided that there is no coming of the "secondary" civilizations, are these civilizations going to be like the Enlightenment thinkers and the progressionists of the 18th century expected them to be, naturally producing *numerous* civilizations (which are usually defined as "secondary" civilizations)? In other words, do the original civilizations have common underlying structures and historical force? It can be inferred that the appearance of these questions was related with the experience of those sociolog-ical and anthropological researchers who perceived these questions through civ-ilization studies, or rather, who carried civilization research by perceiving these questions on the relations between subordinate units (nationalities or nations) of their common civilizations (the "West" in Weber's definition, "Europe" as it was defined by Braudel, or "Zone One" according to Umesao). As Mauss explained, the West in modern time, despite being a civilization, in every country in Europe and America, the interconnected roots of religions and languages, and that "So-cieties live by borrowing from each other , however every country establishes its own nationality precisely by denying the fact that they mutually share these "pri-mary civilizations", "define themselves rather by the refusal of borrowing than by

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[59] James Clifford, "Traditional futures", in *Questions of Tradition*, Mark Philips and Gordon Schochet eds., pp.152-170, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001.

its acceptance."[60]. This duality between one and multiplicity internal to Western civilizations resulted in Western scholars being characterized for a long time by both universalism and nationalism when talking about concepts like society, civilization, and culture, as Mauss stated:

This simultaneously universalist and nationalist belief is actually a distinctive feature of our international and national civilizations of the European West and of non-Indian American. Some would see the Civilization as a perfect nation, corresponding to the 'close state' of Fichte, autonomous and self-sufficient, whose civilization and language of civilization would extend to its political frontiers. Some nations have realized this ideal and others, such as the United States of America, consciously pursuit. Other writers and orators think of the human civilization in the abstract, in the future. Humanity 'in progress' is a commonplace of both philosophy and politics. Lastly, there are others who reconcile the two ideas: the national classes, the nations, the civilizations would only have historical missions vis-à-vis 'the civilization'. Naturally, this civilization is always the Occidental one. It is elevated to be a common ideal and at the same time a rational fund of human progress; and, with optimism aiding, it is made the condition of happiness. The nineteenth century mixed the two ideas, and took 'its' civilization for 'the' civilization. Every nation and every class has done the same thing, and this has provided material for innumerable pleas.

Nevertheless, it is permissible to believe that the novelty in our life has created something new in this order of things. It seems to us that, in our own era, this time, it is in the facts and no longer in ideology that something such as 'the civilization' is being achieved. To begin with, and without nations disappearing or even without all of them being former, a growing capital of international realities and international ideas is being constituted. The international nature of the facts of civilization is becoming more intensive. The number of phenomena of this type is increasing; they are spreading, multiplying each other.[61]

In view of the respective issues of pluralism and nationalism, Mauss had put forth a theory of civilization that lies in-between the two. The works published from the 1890s and the 1920s by this prominent sociologist and ethnologist and his fellow scholars have proposed a theory on the configuration of society that focused on relationships and non-determinism, putting particular emphasis on the bonding function of sacrificial offerings in the studies of sacrifices, the correspondence of social seasons, climate, food distribution, people flows, technology (both physical and non-physical) with social density in the study of social morphology, the "exchange role" of objects connecting people in the study of gift exchanges. The research conducted by Mauss warns us that society is not simply about human affairs, but it is formed in the three abovementioned intermediate objects[62]. In his

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[60] 莫斯、涂尔干、于贝尔：《论技术、技艺与文明》，45页　[Mauss, Durkheim, Hubert, *Techniques, Technology and Civilization*,p.44].

[61] *Ibid.,* in Chinese, p73 [in English, pp. 71-72].

[62] 王铭铭：　莫斯民族学的"社会论"，《西北民族研究》2013年第3期，　117-122页　[WANG

treatises on civilization and technology studies (fragments of which were recently collected into the book *Techniques, Technology and Civilization*), Mauss further expands his concept of intermediate objects to the study of civilization.

Mauss' theory of civilization can be summarized in the following five points:

1) Any society that includes multiple nations has historically had its own material and spiritual culture creations, and the people living in it are proud of its creations, and have developed a social identity. However, the cultural creations of different societies would inevitably form relationships of mutual borrowing, influence and sharing with other surrounding societies. These relationships would go beyond the boundaries of society, and included material characteristics as well as spiritual elements, forming over time a system of its own.

2) In ethnology what we call "civilization" specifically referred to the features of borrowing, sharing and communicating between communities and societies, which surpassed the scope of "society", but was suitable for it, becoming a "supra-societal system".

3) The social elements that included nations were not all shaped as integrated wholes. On the level of social integration, there were also some large scale "civilizations" with corresponding regionality, forming "an area of civilizations", that is, "the geographical extent of the distribution of the total of the common phenomena regarded as characteristic, as typical of this civilization", and "the ensemble of land surfaces inhabited by societies sharing the representations, practice and products which compose the common heritage of this civilization."[63].

4) As a civilization of a supra-societal system, there is no mutual isolation, but in the historical and current reality, the interactions between civilization regions are frequent and intense, both at a social and a supra-social level. "Cross-civilizations interactions" occur in the areas of (1) technology, (2) story-telling and ideologies, (3) trade, (4) ideas, languages, and knowledge, and (5) religions. The result is that "myths, tales, money, commerce, fine arts, techniques, tools, languages, words, scientific knowledge, literary forms and ideals—all these travel and are borrowed" [64]

5) Even though the interactions between societies and civilizations were frequent and intense, civilizations are always multivariate; there is no unitary human civilization.

Mingming, "The Ethnological 'Social Theory' of Marcel Mauss", *Northwestern Journal of Ethnology*, 2013, Vol. 3, pp. 117-122].

[63] 莫斯、涂尔干、于贝尔:《论技术、技艺与文明》，64页．[Mauss, Durkheim, Hubert, *Techniques, Technology and Civilization*, p.63].

[64] *Ibid.*, in Chinese p.39 [in English, p. 38].

Mauss pointed out that civilizations have their own characteristics, and the products of each civilization have their own style, and by analyzing these styles as a whole we can understand the unique form of each civilization, which can be called "civilization type". The geographical distribution of civilization types is characterized by a center-periphery structure, and if ethnologists draw support from archeology and history, it can be possible to discern the distribution pattern of these civilization types[65]. In the process of studying civilization types, Mauss emphasized on the one hand the importance of "tangible" bodies and tools and the methods for using these technologies and intellectual carriers, while also focusing on the other hand on the fact that these tools, technologies and intellectual carriers existed as social phenomena, thus stressing their function as products of "collective consciousness"[66]. Mauss, who had worked for a long time on religious studies, in analyzing the social essence of civilizations and differentiating between the civilization types derived from this analysis, inevitably returned to the sphere of morality and religion, discussing the categories of primitive African religions, Hinduism, Judaism, East Asian religions, and Christianity.[67] Mauss always tried to link together the "three rings" (primitive, ancient and modern), and he attached considerable importance to material culture, thus he discussed religious civilizations, but his treatise is not equal to the similar study carried out by Weber. However, when comparing Weber's *The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations* and Mauss' related treatise on "Collective Ideas and the Diversity of Civilization", we can see that the two share many points in common.

11.

Mauss firmly believed civilization to be a human achievement, while social anthropologist Lévi-Strauss, who was his disciple in the field of ethnology, did not share his optimistic attitude towards civilization. In Mauss' treatise we can still see many instances where archaic societies (these multiple civilizations) are seen as having the role of linking together primitive and modern times, while in the works of Lévi-Strauss this function is rarely brought up, while we can often see the contrast in the dual opposition between primitive and civilized, instead of the "three rings" configuration of primitive, ancient and modern times. "For Levi Strauss, then, primitive cultures are the fruit of egalitarian societies, where relations between groups are settled once and for all and remain constant, whereas civilizations are based on hierarchical societies with wide gaps between groups and hence shifting tensions, social conflicts, political struggles, and continual evolution."[68]. In order to thoroughly understand the "noble savages" different from civilized men, Lévi-Strauss dedicated most of his life to research on tribal soci-

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[65] *Ibid.*, in Chinese p.67-68 [in English, p. 67-68].

[66] *Ibid.*, in Chinese p.68-69 [in English, p. 68-69].

[67] Marcel Mauss, *Oevres 2, Représentations Collectives et Diversité des Civilisations*, pp. 527-698, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1974.

[68] 布罗代尔:《文明史纲》, 37页, 1987 [Braudel, *Grammaire des civilisations,* p. 17].

eties. However, in the last chapter of his masterpiece *Tristes Tropiques*[69], published in the 1950s, after recounting a long, mental and physical journey towards primitive culture, Lévi-Strauss provided a vivid exposition of his own views on civilizations.

Lévi-Strauss had an understanding of the dilemma of civilizations: as Mauss had stated, these civilizations were the result of cross-social exchanges, but when they formed clear-cut boundaries between religions, such as Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity, not only do they create their own worldviews and sociality, but they also differentiated themselves from other types of civilization. Among civilizations, some (like Islam and Catholicism) "behind the screen of a legal and formalist rationalism, we build similar pictures of the world and society in which all difficulties can be solved by a cunning application of logic"[70], while others (such as Buddhism) confront us with two troubling choices: "Anyone who gives an affirmative reply to the question shuts himself up in a monastery: anyone who replies in the negative (that is, who believes that individual salvation is not dependent on the salvation of the whole of humanity) can achieve easy satisfaction in the practice of egotistical virtue. "[71]. Unlike Childe, Lévi-Strauss did not look at the "revolutionary nature" of the urban revolution based on the Neolithic revolution and its reproduction in modern times, believing instead that the civilizations that emerged from this revolution produced excessive communications, causing those organizations that were more systematic because of being closed in the past to disintegrate in the inertia of civilization[72].

It was precisely in the century prior to Lévi-Strauss' *Tristes Tropiques*, that Victorian age anthropologists were dedicated to studying the emergence of great civilizations, and one hundred years later, Lévi-Strauss derived an opposite conclusion from their comparative theories of civilization: "man… himself appears as perhaps the most effective agent working towards the disintegration of the original order of things "[73].

This kind of almost desperate outlook on civilization became a kind of alternative narrative on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean at the eve of the 21st century. Here, considered as an entity bigger than nations, the challenging nature of civilization obtained once again considerable attention. Political scientist Samuel Huntington (1927-2008) published in 1993 "Clash of Civilizations?", which was expanded three years later in his famous book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, in which he states that conflicts after the Cold War would happen because of cultural reasons, and not because of ideologies. Cultures with long-term historical influence had formed eight civilization types with

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[69] 列维-斯特劳斯:《忧郁的热带》，王志明译，北京：三联书店，2000 [Lévi-Strauss,*Tristes Tropiques*, translated by John and Doreen Weightman, New York: Penguin Books, 1992].

[70] *Ibid.*, in Chinese, 531页 [in English, p. 405].

[71] *Ibid.*, in Chinese, 541页 [in English, pp. 411-412.].

[72] *Ibid.*, in Chinese, 544页 [in English, p. 413].

[73] *Ibid.*, in Chinese, 543页 [in English, p. 413].

centers and external extensions, including Western, Latin American, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Japanese, and African civilizations. In order to understand world conflicts, it is necessary to understand the clashes between civilizations, especially the conflicts brought by civilization divides in the Eurasian continent throughout history, the issues of the civilization systems formed by the nations at the boundaries of the crescent-shaped zone from Africa to Central Asia, the conflicts between religions and between different schools of the same religion, and the challenges brought by Sinic civilizations[74]. Huntington was a political scientist, and he certainly had a hidden strategy centered on the United States. Still, after sorting out the historical patterns and current features of civilizations, he reached a conclusion that was almost identical to that of Lévi-Strauss: "On a worldwide basis Civilization seems in many respects to be yielding to barbarism, generating the image of an unprecedented phenomenon, a global Dark Age, possibly descending on humanity.'"[75].

Huntington clearly called for overcoming the clash of civilizations through international understanding and cooperation, which were the preconditions for remaking the world order, but as a Western scholar, the wording he chose for expressing the concept of "clash of civilizations" was quickly given other meanings. In the "Eastern" block, or by "Zone Two" surrounded by "Zone One", what Müller had defined as "Semitic" and "Turanian" civilizations, especially in Iran and China, the expression "clash of civilizations" was often replaced with words like "dialogue", "harmonious but different". In response to Huntington's "clash of civilizations", a former president of Iran put forth the idea of creating a space for dialogue among civilizations in 1998 in front of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Subsequently, 2001 was approved as the Year of Dialogue among Civilizations, and Iran also looked for cities within its borders that had a tradition of cross-civilization coexistence (such as Isfahan), as symbols of the determination to bring cross-civilization exchanges between what Lévi-Strauss had regarded the civilization blocks divided between East and West. In China, when the "theory of the clash of civilization" came to the attention of many people, the return to historical civilizations (especially that of Confucian social thought) became the common pursuit of scholars with different political stances. Even though this going back to the past did not imply that these scholars were abandoning the tradition of "making the past serve the present and making foreign things serve China" of the previous generation of academics, returning to the idea of historical civilizations naturally led Chinese academia to participate in the intellectual structure of East and West, of Zones One and Two.

It was right in this international climate that some ethnic archeologists went back to investigating "cradles of civilization" (Mesopotamia and Egypt), and, on

[74] 亨廷顿:《文明的冲突与世界秩序的重建》，周琪等译，北京: 新华出版社，1998 [Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon& Schuster, 1996].

[75] *Ibid.*, in Chinese, p372 [in English, p. 321.

the basis of Mauss' concept of "borrowing" and of archeology, started criticizing Huntington's idea that there were no interactions between early civilizations[76]; at the same time, some sociologists tried to carry out a more historical and theoretical reassessment of the "difference between East and West" from a wider perspective. For example, in 2006 prominent anthropologist Jack Goody published the book *The Theft of History*[77], where he dedicated one third of the chapters to the analysis of three civilizations, which included Joseph Needham's studies on Chinese civilization and the history of science and technology, the study by Elias on European Renaissance and the origin of the civilization process, and Braudel's work on the origins of capitalism in the Mediterranean. Goody did not believe these important studies to be completely wrong, but from them he acutely remarked that his three precursors all regarded Europe as being a truly scientific, truly modern civilization and the "ethical", true birthplace of capitalism. In their works, they all referred to other civilizations, but in their comparative research they would emphasize the characteristics of European civilizations, and they credited that "Supposedly exclusive line of development"[78] represented by Europe with the achievements of modern human civilization, especially attributing science, etiquette and capitalism to European rationalism, French court society, and trade and commerce in the Mediterranean region. Goody concluded that for great scholars like Needham, Elias and Braudel, despite being very alert towards a teleological vision of history and ethnocentrism, it was still difficult for them to avoid falling into these traps. In the other parts of his work, Goody explored the views that Europe had on Eastern feudalism and despotism, as well as how European "people" (including general scholars and non-experts) entirely attributed to Europe the rise of traditions like cities and towns, universities, democracy, individualism and romantic feelings such as love, examined from two other important aspects: Europe's teleological vision of history, and its ethnocentric view of civilizations.

According to Goody, the history of civilizations saw the appearance of world civilizations with multiple centers, and there had been close interactions between civilizations for thousands of years. For instance, in the Eurasian continent there had always been exchanges between East and West, and the science, etiquette and capitalism of modern Europe can be seen as the result of these exchanges.[79] Nonetheless, looking at civilizations from a conceptual point of view, despite acknowledging the fact that there were multiple centers of civilization, and admitting the existence of interactions between civilizations, even the greatest and most conscientious scholar could play down the key contributions of these exchanges on the shaping of civilizations, using a comparative methodology, cut off the bonds

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[76] David Wengrow, *What Makes Civilization? The Ancient Near East and Future" of the West*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

[77] Jack Goody, *The Theft of History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

[78] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[79] Jack Goody, *The East in the West*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

between civilizations. From a certain perspective, this seemingly shows that many current theories on the historical factors behind the separation and clash of civilizations can also become a driving force behind said separation and clash.

12

Stating that civilizations are a supra-societal system is at times a way of explaining that we do not need to impose the social categories that arose in modern times and corresponding to nationalities on this or other categories (from China's all-under-heaven , the "integrity" of India's caste system, to village societies and tribes, they all belong to these categories). Other times it is used to show that if we did not make comparison with ethnic pride and the things relying on this sense of pride and thought about the limitations of this sentiment, ethnic pride would be probably demolished at its foundations. Clearly dividing civilizations and "world systems", is a way of showing that the standpoints of multiple civilization or one civilization never accurately described the world's original form, as well as stating that civilizations would not turn into one world because they shared one world. The reason why civilization is said to be the result of exchanges is because even though civilizations being intersubjective and intercultural were translated into different versions, they each still had their own systems, in which "there is a bit of me in you, and a bit of you in me", and "there is a difference between you and me". If we say that these systems and these differences will lead us to a "Dark Age", then we can also say that this is not because of the boundaries existing between civilizations, but mainly because these boundaries did not only exist between civilizations, but also between nationalities smaller than civilizations. There is no nationality bigger than civilizations, but at the same time, there is no nationality that does not include multiple civilizations (not only including Redfield's "primary" and "secondary" civilizations, but also the diversity within these two kinds of civilization, that is, diverse "primary" and "secondary" civilizations). The different content of civilizations coexists within a nationality, and at times they can perhaps be in a situation of "being harmonious but different", but because in most cases coexisting does not mean having equal status, there has always been a differentiation between "primary and secondary". Thus, just as the division and contradictions between classes, we see the division and contrasts between nationalities within a civilization. As argued by Mauss, Goody and Lévi-Strauss, accepting the fact that exchanges can correct the civilization narcissism of nationalities is the only path towards hope, but we need a deeper understanding of the issue brought by the double relationships between nationalities and civilizations.

Appendix
Chinese citations, English translations of the citations and original English texts[80]

1.

Chinese citation

文明"在空间上超越了单一国族的领土范围，在时间上超出了单一社会存在的历史时段"。[81]不过，这类实体不是与社会无关的，它们常为社会所"兼收"，常穿插于社会之间，成为不同社会之间关系的结果。[82]

English translation

Civilization "in terms of space goes beyond the territorial limitation of a single nationality, and in terms of time it goes beyond the historical period of the existence of a single society".[83] Nevertheless, this kind of entities is not unrelated to society, as they generally are "integrated" and interweaved with society, becoming the result of the relations between different societies.[84]

Original English text

They extend beyond the territory of any single nation, or they develop over periods of time exceeding the history of any single society (p36); They rather overflow frontiers, either by spreading from specific centres by their own powers of expansion, or as a result of the relationships established between different societies, in which case they become their common production. (Marcel Mauss, Nathan Schlanger, Techniques, eds., *Technology and Civilization*, p37. Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2006).

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[80] *Editor's note*: This Appendix was conducted by ZHAO Maner (赵满儿), MSc student of China in Comparative Perspective at the LSE (2016-2017). All the citations, English translations of the citations and original English texts have been arranged under each session of the paper. 'English translations of the citations' including direct quotations and mixed with the author's interpretation of Chinese translation of English work. They have been translated into English by an Italian translator. The author approved the accuracy of the English translations of the citations. However, some of them are not quite the same as the original English texts.

[81] 莫斯、涂尔干、于贝尔：《论技术、技艺与文明》，蒙养山人译、罗杨校，37页，北京：世界图书出版公司，2010。

[82] 莫斯、涂尔干、于贝尔：《论技术、技艺与文明》，38页。

[83] Marcel Mauss, Émile Durkheim, Henri Hubert, *Techniques, Technology and Civilization* (*Lun jishu, jiyi yu wenming*), trans. Manyatta, rev. Luo Yang, p. 37, Beijing: World Publishing Corporation, 2010.

[84] Mauss, Durkheim, Hubert, *Techniques, Technology and Civilization*, p. 38.

2.

Chinese citation

穆勒称，其分布范围"从中国到比利牛斯山脉，从科摩瑞海角越过高加索，再到拉普兰"三大方言区，认为这些语言文化区域先于"民族"。[85]

English translation of the citation

Müller's distribution is "from China to the Pyrenees mountain range, from Cape Comorin, crossing over to Caucasus to Lapland"). Müller believed that these three linguistic and cultural areas predated "nationalities". [86]

Original English text

Hence we do find in the nomadic or Turanian languages scattered from China to the Pyrenees, from Cape Comorin, across the Caucasus, to Lapland… in Max Müller, *Comparative Mythology: an essay*, edited by A. Smythe Palmer, p.11. Kessinger Publishing, 2003.

Chinese citation

20世纪初杰出人类学家波亚士（Franz Boas, 1958-1942）交互使用文明与文化概念，时常以"其他文明"来形容"原始文化"。[87]

English translation

In the early 20th century, anthropologist Franz Boas (1958-1942) would interchangeably use the concepts civilization and culture, often describing "primitive cultures" as "other civilizations". [88]

Original English text in author's note

Anthropology teaches better than any other science the relativity of the values of civilization. (Franz Boas, A Franz Boas Reader: *The Shaping of American*

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[85] 穆勒：《比较神话学》，金泽译，上海：上海文艺出版社，1989，9页。

[86] Max Müller, *Comparative Mythology* (*Bijiao shenhuaxue*), trans. Jin Zen, Shanghai: Shanghai Literature and Art Publishing House, 1989, p. 9.

[87] 1907年波亚士在演讲中强调"人类学比其他学科更善于教导我们，文明价值是有相对性的"（Franz Boas, *A Franz Boas Reader: The Shaping of American Anthropology, 1883-1911*, edited by George Stocking jr., p.280, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974），他所说的固然包括诸古代文明，但主要是指有别于后来人的原始人的文明，实指其引领下的现代美国文化人类学定义下的"文化"。

[88] In 1907 Franz Boas emphasized in one of his speeches that "Anthropology is better suited than other disciplines to teach us that values of a civilization are relative" (Franz Boas, *A Franz Boas Reader: The Shaping of American Anthropology, 1883-1911*, edited by George Stocking Jr., p.280, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974); even though he was also talking about ancient civilizations, he was mostly referring to the civilizations of primitive men, who were different from the men who came after them, indicating what modern American cultural anthropology defined as "cultures" under his lead.

Anthropology, 1883-1911, edited by George Stocking jr., p.280, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).

Chinese citation

　　黑格尔认为，与国家相联系的约束机制不是"自由"的桎梏，"我们应当把这样的限制看做是解放的必要条件"[89]

English translation of the citation

　　Hegel believed that binding mechanisms related to a nation were not shackles of "freedom", since "We should regard this kind of restriction as necessary conditions for emancipation".[90]

Original English text

　　We should on the contrary look upon such limitation as the indispensable proviso of emancipation, in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, Translated by J. Sibree, M.A, p.56. Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001.

3.

Chinese citation

　　莫斯的批评更为直接，他说，其文明形态学研究"有点矫情"，"那些从道德上将文明和国家分为强大的和弱小的、有机的和松散的做法，加之对历史哲学的过分考虑真的只对普通大众有所裨益。这毫无疑问又倒退到过时的诸如'文化命运'、'历史使命'概念，倒退到阻碍大众历史的甚至达到自称政党社会科学的社会学的术语中。社会学家们真应该在基佐那儿寻找更多的概念和事实……如果形态学还是必须去做物品传播的地域和层次的简单分类，抑或被先验的'文化'概念或所谓的'某某文化'牵着鼻子走"[91]。

English translation of the citation

　　His criticism of Spengler was even more straightforward: Mauss said that his morphological study of civilizations was "a little pretentious", and that "dividing civilizations and nations into strong and soft, organic and loose, on a moral basis, as well as the excessive focus on the philosophy of history, is only beneficial to the general public. This will doubtlessly make us go back to out of date concepts like 'cultural destiny' and 'historical mission', as well as to sociological terminology that obstructs popular history, and even reaches the self-claimed social sciences of political parties. Sociologists should truly seek more ideas and facts than by Guizot… If morphology must still produce a simple classification of areas and levels

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[89] 黑格尔：《历史哲学》，王造时译，42页，上海：上海书店出版社，1999。

[90] G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, trans. Wang Zaoshi, p. 42, Shanghai: Shanghai Bookstore Publishing House, 1999.

[91] 莫斯、涂尔干、于贝尔：《论技术、技艺与文明》，67页。

of goods for dissemination, or to be led by the nose by the transcendental concept of 'culture' or the so-called 'such-and-such culture'".[92]

Original English text

Equally literacy, in our opinion, is Spengler's *Morphologie de la civilization*. These moral classifications of civilizations and nations into hard and soft, into organic and loose, together with this philosophy of history with its vast and colossal considerations, are really of value only to the general public. It is a regression devoid of any precision into the antiquated formulae of "cultural destinies", "historic missions", into the whole jargon of this unconscious sociology that encumbers vulgar history and reaches even the self-styled social science of political parties. The sociologists would truly find more ideas and facts in Guizot… If here again morphology must be separated from the simple cartography of areas and layers of distribution of objects. etc., if it is guided by the a priori ideas of "the culture" or of *a priori* defined "such and such cultures". (p66)

Chinese citation

克虏伯称，其文明著述"基本上是根据斯宾格勒提出的两项研究原则写就的，其一，每种文化都有其具有特色的基本模式，其二，这些模式是在有限度的成长（limited growths）中出现的"[93]。

English translation of the citation

Kroeber claimed that his writings on civilizations "are fundamentally based on two of Spengler's research principles, the first being that each culture has a particular basic pattern, and the second that these patterns are characterized by limited growth"[94].

Original English text

The two Spenglerian principles with which this study is, then, in essential accord are, first, the existence of certain fundamental patterns characteristics of each major culture, and second, that these occur in limited growths.

Chinese citation

受涂尔干社会学影响，柴尔德几乎将文明视为严格意义上的社会，认为文明比新石器时代村社具有更高的社会凝聚力，"农人、工匠、祭司、统治者形成一个共同体，不仅因为语言与信仰相同，而且因为他们起相互

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[92] Mauss, Durkheim, Hubert, *Techniques, Technology and Civilization* (*Lun jishu, jiyi yu wenming*), p. 67.

[93] Alfred Kroeber, *Configurations of Culture Growth*，828页。

[94] Alfred Kroeber, *Configurations of Culture Growth*, p. 828.

补充的作用，这些作用，对于共同体全部（即被冠以"文明"的实体）的福祉，十分必要"。[95]

尽管文明的兴起总是伴随着城市势力向"蛮夷"之地的扩张，但柴尔德坚持认为，文明与野蛮之地之间的关系是交换性质的："埃及人、苏美尔人和印度人积累了大量剩余食物。同时，他们需要从海外进口必要的原材料，如金属、建筑所用的木材，及奢侈品。那些控制这些自然资源的共同体从而能通过交换而从城市的剩余财富中分一杯羹。它们用所得作为资本来支持全职专家——工匠或统治者，直到后者取得其技术与组织上的成就，并进而丰富了的野蛮人的经济，使它也有可能生产出实质性的剩余"[96]。

English translation of the citation

Being influenced by Durkheim's sociological thought, Childe viewed civilization as society in its strictest sense, believing civilization to have a higher degree of social cohesion than Neolithic village communities: "Farmers, artisans priests, and rulers shaped a community, not only because they had the same language and faith, but they also carried out roles that completed each other, and these roles were essential for the well-being of the community as a whole (the entity called "civilization")"[97].

Although the rise of civilizations would always follow the expansion of the city's control to "barbaric" areas, Childe would insist that the relationship between civilized and barbaric regions was characterized by exchanges: "The Egyptians, the Mesopotamians, and the Indians accumulated great amounts of surplus in food. At the same time, they needed to import indispensable raw materials from overseas, such as metal, wood for construction, and luxury goods. Thus, the communities controlling these natural resources could get their part of the surplus wealth of the city through exchanges. They used what they acquired as capital to support full-time specialists – artisans or rulers, until the latter acquired their technology and the achievements in terms of organization, and then enriched the economy of barbarians, making it possible for them to also produce material surplus"[98].

Original English text

Peasants, craftsmen, priests and rulers form a community, only by reason of identity of language and belief, but also because each performs mutually complementary functions, needed for the well-being (as redefined under civilization) of the whole.

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[95] Gordon Childe, "The urban revolution", *Town Planning Review*, Vol.21, Issue 1, p.16, 1950.

[96] Gordon Childe, "The urban revolution", pp.16.

[97] Gordon Childe, "The urban revolution", *Town Planning Review*, Vol.21, Issue 1, p.17, 1950.

[98] Gordon Childe, "The urban revolution", pp.17.

The Egyptians, the Sumerians and the Indus people had accumulated vast reserves of surplus food. As the same time they had to import form abroad necessary raw materials like mental and building timber as well as "luxurics." Communities controlling these natural resources could in exchange claim a slice of the urban surplus. They could use it as capital to support full-time specialists—craftsmen or rulers—until the latter's achievement in technique and organization had so enriched barbarian economies that they too could produce a substantial surplus in their return.

Chinese citation

文明的原初地理分布形成甚早，但文明的观念，确反映着其与能够播化己身"风尚"的城市之密切关系。由此，文明通过其与野蛮（汉语中的"夷"，西文中的"alterity"、"barbarian"、"savage"、"other"）的区分而获得意义，指文明中人与在文明影响力之外（尤其是城市之外）生活的人们的差异。因而，不难理解，文明（civilization）来自拉丁*civilis*，意为 civil，与拉丁*civis*（citizen，市民）有关，也与 *civitas*（city or city-state，城市或城邦）有关。[99]

English translation of the citation

The geographical distribution in earliest stages of civilization took shape very early, but the notion of civilization truly reflects its close relationship with the cities that could disseminate their "current customs". Therefore, civilizations acquired meaning through their differentiation from uncivilized people (*yi* in Chinese, "alterity", "barbarian", "savage" in the West), indicating the differences between the people who lived within a civilization and the ones living outside the influence of civilization (especially those who lived outside the cities). Thus, it is easy to understand how the word civilization came from the Latin *civilis*, which meant "civil", and was connected to the Latin word *civis* ("citizen"), as well as to *civitas* ("city" or "city-state"). [100]

Original English text

Raymond Williams, *Keywords*, London: Fontana Paperbacks, 1983, p. 57.

4.

Chinese citation

从欧洲与欧洲以外的文明的对比中，布罗代尔得出一个结论："自希腊思想的发展开始，西方文明一直趋向于理性主义，并因此摆脱了宗教生

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[99] 威廉斯：《关键词》，刘建基译，46页，北京：三联书店，2005。
[100] Raymond Williams, *Keywords* (*Guanjian ci*), trans. Liu Jianji, p. 46, Beijing: Joint Publishing Company, 2005.

活……除了少数例外（中国的智者、12世纪的阿拉伯哲学家），在西方之外的世界历史上还没有发现过这样明显地摆脱宗教的事例"[101]。

English translation of the citation

By comparing European and non-European civilizations, Braudel reached the following conclusion: "From the development of Greek thought, Western civilizations have always moved in the direction of rationalism, and because of this they have broken away from religious life… Apart from a small number of exceptions (the Chinese sages, the Arabian philosophers of the 12th century), in the history of the world outside from the West we have yet to discover a kind of similar, clear-cut example of breaking away from religion"[102].

Original English text:

Since the development of Greek thought, however, the tendency of Western civilization has been towards rationalism and hence away from the religious life… With very few exceptions (certainly Chinese sophists, and certain Arab philosophers in the twelfth century), no such marked turning away from religion is to be found in the history of the world outside the West (Fernand Braudel, *A History of Civilization*, translated by Richard Mayne, p.23. New York: Penguin Books, 1994).

Chinese citation

一区的民族历史上起源于"蛮夷"，或者说，文明领域的外部。后来，这些民族从二区的中心汲取了文明养分，经历了封建主义、绝对主义和资产阶级革命的阶段。在当今世界，一区的国族基于资本主义基础，抵达了现代文明的高层次。至于二区，此为所有古代文明的家园。然而，二区所含诸区域并没有经历封建分化时期，而是发展了了大规模专制帝国，这些帝国常因内部矛盾而分裂。最终，二区的许多地区成为殖民地或类殖民地。近些年，二区的国家经历了一系列革命，终于追随一条迈向现代化的新道路。[103]

English translation of the citation

"The peoples of Zone One historically descended from the "barbarians", or from outside civilized territories. Later on, these peoples absorbed the civilization from the heart of Zone Two, and went through the stages of feudalism, absolutism, and the bourgeois revolution. In the present world, the nations of Zone One are built on the basis of capitalism, and have reached the highest level of modern civilization. On the other hand, Zone Two is the homeland of all ancient civiliza-

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[101] 布罗代尔：《文明史纲》，肖昶等译，桂林：广西师范大学出版社，1987，43页。

[102] Fernand Braudel, *Grammaire des civilizations* (*Wenming shi gang*), trans. Xiao Chang *et al.*, Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 1987, p. 43.

[103] Tadao Umesao, *An Ecological View of History*, pp.95-96.

tions. However, all the areas of Zone Two did not experience a phase of feudalism, developing instead into large-scale autocratic empires, which would often break apart because of internal turmoil. Ultimately, many regions in Zone Two became colonies or semi-colonies. In recent years, the nations of Zone Two have gone through a series of revolutions, finally pursuing a new path of modernization."[104]

Original English text

The people of Zone One originated historically as groups of 'barbarians', or those outside the sphere of civilization. After absorbing civilization from Zone Two centers, these populations passed through stages of feudalism, absolutism, and bourgeois revolution. In the contemporary world, the nations of Zone One have achieved a high level of modern civilization, built upon a capitalist foundation. As for Zone Two, it was host to all of the major civilizations of antiquity. However, instead of a feudal period, the regions of Zone Two saw the development of vast despotic empires, which were riven by internal contradictions. Many areas of Zone Two eventually became colonies or quasi-colonies of Zone One countries. In recent years, the nations of Zone Two have experienced a series of revolutions, and at last attempting to follow a path toward a new kind of modernization.

5.

Chinese citation

然而，此阶段，介于国族与世界体系之间文明，持续作为世界史的结构因素发挥者作用——即使是强调地中海特殊性的布罗代尔也承认，"一个文明既不是某种特定的经济，也不是特定的社会，而是存在于一系列经济或社会之中、不易发生渐变的某种东西"[105]。

English translation of the citation

Even so, civilizations in this stage between the national and world system continue to perform the role of structural factors of world history: even Braudel, who emphasized the specificity of the Mediterranean, acknowledged that "a civilization is not some kind of specific economy, or a specific society, but it is something that exists among a series of economies and societies, and does change easily" [106].

Original English text

A civilization, then, is neither a given economy nor a given society, but something which can persist through a series of economies or societies, barely susceptible to gradual change. (p35)

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[104] Tadao Umesao, *An Ecological View of History*, pp.95-96.

[105] 布罗代尔，《文明史纲》，54页。

[106] Braudel, *Grammaire des civilisations*, p. 54.

6.

Chinese citation

18世纪末期起，文明成为通用词，是不可数的，意指过程和确立的状态，强调的是世俗的、进步的人类自我发展，"不仅表达历史过程的含义，而且凸显了现代性的相关意涵：一种确立的优雅、秩序状态"[107]。

English translation of the citation

Starting from the end of the 18th century, *civilization* became a commonly used word, an uncountable noun indicating the process and establishment, with an emphasis on the self-development of humanity towards secularism and progress, "expressing not only the connotation of a historical process, but also clearly indicating a relevant implication of modernity: an established graceful, orderly state"[108].

Original English text

Civilization expressed this sense of historical process, but also celebrated the associated sense of modernity: an achieved condition of refinement and order. (p58)

7.

Chinese citation

在解释历史文明与现代文明之间关系时，人类学研究者要么采取阶层性的解释（如雷德菲尔德、孔恩、费孝通），要么采取整体性的解释（如杜蒙、萨林斯、谭拜尔），至1970年代初，已提出有必要"从介入者的文化分类、世界观、价值系统，考察其所预想的现代化过程"[109]

English translation of the citation

Up until the early 1970s, anthropologists have either adopted a hierarchical interpretation (like Redfield, Cohn, Fei), or an integral interpretation (such as Dumont, Sahlins, Tambiah) for explaining the relation between historical and modern civilizations, also raising the need to "adopt the perspective of a participant's cultural classification, worldviews and value systems to examine the modernization process as they expect it"[110].

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[107] 威廉斯：《关键词》，47页。

[108] Williams, *Keywords*, p. 47.

[109] Milton Singer, *When a Great Tradition Modernizes: An Approach to Indian Civilization*, p.384, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972.

[110] Milton Singer, *When a Great Tradition Modernizes: An Approach to Indian Civilization*, p.384, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972.

Original English text

It will look at the process of modernization as envisaged by those engaged in it, in their cultural categories, world view and value system.

Chinese citation

借用人类学家克利福德（James Clifford）的话说，在这样的论述中，"传统变成了在新方式上复杂的、开放的主体"，成为"通向不同而相互关联的未来的未解体的而又生命力的图景"[111]。

English translation of the citation

Using the words of anthropologist James Clifford, in this interpretation "tradition becomes a complex and open subject in a new way", turning into "an unsolved prospect full of vitality leading to different but mutually related futures"[112].

Original English text

Tradition becomes a newly complex, open-ended, subject.

With a vision of traditions as unresolved and productive ways into our different, interconnected futures

8.

Chinese citation

如莫斯表白的：近代西方虽是一个文明体，欧美各国，宗教和语言之根相通，同时，"每个社会都依靠相互间的借鉴来生存"，然而，各国为了建立自身的国族认同，恰恰是通过否认相互之间共享的"先在文明"、"恰恰是通过否认这种借鉴来定义自己的"[113]。

English translation of the citation

As Mauss explained, the West in modern time, despite being a civilization, in every country in Europe and America, the interconnected roots of religions and languages, and that "the survival of each civilization depends on mutual borrowing", however every country establishes its own nationality precisely by denying the fact that they mutually share these "primary civilizations", "they define themselves exactly by denying these borrowings"[114].

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[111] James Clifford, "Traditional futures", in *Questions of Tradition*, Mark Philips and Gordon Schochet eds., pp.152-170, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001.

[112] James Clifford, "Traditional futures", in *Questions of Tradition*, Mark Philips and Gordon Schochet eds., pp.152-170, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001.

[113] 莫斯、涂尔干、于贝尔：《论技术、技艺与文明》，45页。

[114] Mauss, Durkheim, Hubert, *Techniques, Technology and Civilization*, p. 45.

Original English text

Societies live by borrowing from each other, but they define themselves rather by the refusal of borrowing than by its acceptance. (p44)

Chinese citation

这种同时兼具的普遍主义和民族主义信仰，事实上是西欧和美国的国际主义与民族主义的独特特征。有的人会将"文明"视为一个完美的国家形态，就如费希特的"闭合状态"（the closed state），它是自治的、自足的，其文明和文明的语言延伸至这个国家的政治边界。有的国家已经实现了这个理想，但是有的却还在蓄意追求，比如美国。其他的作者和演讲家则认为人类文明是抽象的，未来的。"进步中的"的人类在哲学和政治学里都是司空见惯的话题。最终，有人将两种概念整合在了一起：和大写的"文明"相比，国家的阶层，国族，及相关各种文明都只是历史上的一个阶段。这种文明自然总是西方的文明。它被拔高到既是人类的普遍理想，也是人类进步的理性基础；在乐观主义的帮助下，它成为人类幸福的条件。19世纪混合着这两种思想，将"西方的"文明变成了"唯一的"文明。每个国家和每个阶级都在做同样的事情，这也为无数的借口提供了材料。尽管如此，我们可以认为生活中的那些新奇事物已经按它们的既定秩序创造了一些新的东西。似乎对我们而言，在我们自己的时代，诸如"唯一的文明"这类事情的实现是体现在事实上而不再是思想上。首先，国家没有消失，有的甚至还没建立，但一个国际性的事实和观念是新型兴资本主义正在崛起。文明事实的国际性特征越来越强烈。这类现象日益增多：它们在蔓延并相互繁殖。[115]

English translation of the citation

This kind faith, universalistic and nationalistic at the same time, is in fact a peculiar characteristic of Western European and American internationalism and nationalism. Some see "civilization" as a perfect state pattern, such as Fichte's "closed state", autonomous, self-sufficient political boundaries of this state where its civilization and civilized language arrived to its political boundaries. Some states have already realized this ideal, while others are still pursuing this goal, like the United States. Other authors and speakers believe that human civilization is something abstract that belongs in the future. Humanity "in the process of civilization" is a common concept in philosophy and politics. Finally, there are people who combine these two concepts together: compared to *Civilization* with a capital C, the hierarchy of the state, the nation and all sorts of related civilizations are only an historical stage. This civilization is naturally the Western civilization. It has been built up as the universal idea of humanity, as well as the rational foundations of human progress. With the assistance of optimism, it became the condition for human happiness. The 19th century integrated these two thoughts, transforming "Western civilization" into the "only" civilization. Each country and each

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[115] 莫斯、涂尔干、于贝尔：《论技术、技艺与文明》，73页。

stage experienced the same situation, providing material for uncountable excuses. Nevertheless, we can believe that those novelties in our lives have created some new things according to their own order. This is like telling us that in our time, the realization of many things like the "only civilization" are no longer part of the thinking realm. First of all, states have not faded away, some still actually have to be founded, but an international perspective and neo-capitalism have been propagating. The international characteristic of facts and thoughts are getting good. The internationality of civilized facts is growing stronger. This kind of phenomenon growrew day by day: they are expanding and propagating themselves.[116]

Original English text

This simultaneously universalist and nationalist belief is actually a distinctive feature of our international and national civilizations of the European West and of non-Indian American. Some would see the Civilization as a perfect nation, corresponding to the 'close state' of Fichte, autonomous and self-sufficient, whose civilization and language of civilization would extend to its political frontiers. Some nations have realized this ideal and others, such as the United States of America, consciously pursue it. Other writers and orators think of the human civilization in the abstract, in the future. Humanity 'in progress' is a commonplace of both philosophy and politics. Lastly, there are others who reconcile the two ideas: the national classes, the nations, the civilizations would only have historical missions vis-à-vis 'the civilization'. Naturally, this civilization is always the Occidental one. It is elevated to be a common ideal and at the same time a rational fund of human progress; and, with optimism aiding, it is made the condition of happiness. The nineteenth century mixed the two ideas, and took 'its' civilization for 'the' civilization. Every nation and every class has done the same thing, and this has provided material for innumerable pleas.

Nevertheless, it is permissible to believe that the novelty in our life has created something new in this order of things. It seems to us that, in our own era, this time, it is in the facts and no longer in ideology that something such as 'the civilization' is being achieved. To begin with, and without nations disappearing or even without all of them being former, a growing capital of international realities and international ideas is being constituted. The international nature of the facts of civilization is becoming more intensive. The number of phenomena of this type is increasing; they are spreading, multiplying each other. (Pp71-72)

Chinese citation

其三，包括民族在内的社会单元，不是一切整合体的形态，在社会整合体层次之上，还形成若干规模巨大的"文明体"，其存在有相应的区域性，构成"文明的区域"，即"文明的标志性特征的普遍现象得以完全传播的

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[116] Mauss, Durkheim, Hubert, *Techniques, Technology and Civilization*, p. 73.

地理范围"，及"共享构成这一文明遗产的象征、实践和产物的社会所占据的全部地域"117。

English translation of the citation

Thirdly, the social elements that included nationalities were not all shaped as integrated wholes. On the level of social integration, there were also some large scale "civilizations" with corresponding regionality, forming "regions of civilizations", that is, "geographical scopes where the common phenomena of the characteristics marking a civilization were able to be completely spread", and "the whole area occupied by a society where the emblems, practice and products transmitted by a civilization are shared"118.

Original English text

"an area of civilizations", that is, the geographical extent of the distribution of the total of the common phenomena regarded as characteristic, as typical of this civilization", and "the ensemble of land surfaces inhabited by societies sharing the representations, practice and products which compose the common heritage of this civilization. (p63)

Chinese citation

其结果是，"神话、传统、货币、贸易、艺术品、技艺、工具、语言、词汇、科学知识、文化形式和理念——所有这些都是流动的，相互借用的"。119

English translation of the citation

The result is that "mythology, traditions, currency, trade, artistic pieces and skills, tools, languages, vocabulary, scientific knowledge, cultural forms and theories – they all circulate and borrow from each other." 120

Original English text

Myths, tales, money, commerce, fine arts, techniques, tools, languages, words, scientific knowledge, literary forms and ideals—all these travel and are borrowed. (p38)

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117 莫斯、涂尔干、于贝尔：《论技术、技艺与文明》，64页。
118 Mauss, Durkheim, Hubert, *Techniques, Technology and Civilization*, p. 64.
119 莫斯、涂尔干、于贝尔：《论技术、技艺与文明》，39页。
120 Mauss, Durkheim, Hubert, *Techniques, Technology and Civilization*, p. 39.

9.

Chinese citation

　　"对列维-斯特劳斯来说，原始文化是平均主义社会的果实，在这样的社会里，群体之间的关系一成不变、确定不移；而文明则是建立在等级制社会的基础上的，群体之间存在着很大的隔阂，因此，紧张局势、社会冲突、政治斗争以及持续的发展交替进行着"[121]

English translation of the citation

　　"In Lévi-Strauss' opinion, primitive cultures are the result of egalitarian societies, and in this kind of societies the relations between communities are always the same, and are predetermined; on the other hand, civilizations are established on the basis of hierarchical societies, where there are great barriers between communities, thus alternating between tense situations, political struggles and sustainable development" [122].

Original English text

　　For Levi Strauss, then, primitive cultures are the fruit of egalitarian societies, where relations between groups are settled once and for all and remain constant, whereas civilizations are based on hierarchical societies with wide gaps between groups and hence shifting tensions, social conflicts, political struggles, and continual evolution. (p17)

Chinese citation

　　诸文明中，有的（如伊斯兰和天主教）"在一层法律的与拘泥形式的理性主义掩护下"，"把世界与社会描绘成其中所有问题都可能已逻辑诡辩加以解决"[123]，有的（如佛教）使我们面对两个令人不安的选择："任何人如果觉得个人救赎必须建基于全人类的救赎的话，便会把自己封闭于修道院里面；任何对此问题提出否定方案（即认为个人救赎不必和全人类均得到救赎有关）的人则在唯我主义的美德中得到廉价的满足自得"[124]。

English translation of the citation

　　Among civilizations, some (like Islam and Catholicism) "under the protection of a legal layer and a strict formation of rationalism" "consider the issues of the world and society as being solvable through logic and sophistry" [125], while others (such as Buddhism) confront us with two troubling choices: anybody who thinks that individual salvation is necessarily founded on the salvation of the

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[121] 布罗代尔：《文明史纲》，37页。

[122] Braudel, *Grammaire des civilizations* (*Wenming shi gang*), p. 37.

[123] 列维-斯特劳斯：《忧郁的热带》，531页.

[124] 列维-斯特劳斯：《忧郁的热带》，541页.

[125] Lévi-Strauss, *Tristes Tropiques*, p. 531.

whole of humanity, will close themselves in a monastery; anybody who brings forth a negative answer to this question (that is, who believes that individual salvation is not dependent on the salvation of the whole of humanity) will instead be content in the virtue of solipsism"[126].

Original English text

Behind the screen of a legal and formalist rationalism, we build similar pictures of the world and society in which all difficulties can be solved by a cunning application of logic. (p. 405)

Anyone who gives an affirmative reply to the question shuts himself up in a monastery: anyone who replies in the negative can achieve easy satisfaction in the practice of egotistical virtue. (Levi-Strauss, *Tristes Tropiques, translated by John and Doreen Weightman*, pp. 411-412. New York: Penguin Books, 1992).

Chinese citation

恰好是在列维-斯特劳斯写作《忧郁的热带》之间约一百年，英国维多利亚时代的人类学家致力于呈现文明的伟大，一百年之后，列维-斯特劳斯却从其比较文明论中得出一个相反的结论："人类自己似乎成为整个世界事物秩序瓦解过程最强有力的催化剂"[127]。

English translation of the citation

It was precisely in the century prior to Lévi-Strauss' *Tristes Tropiques*, that Victorian age anthropologists were dedicated to studying the emergence of great civilizations, and one hundred years later, Lévi-Strauss derived an opposite conclusion from their comparative theories of civilization: "Humanity itself has almost become the most powerful catalyzer in the process of disintegration of the order of the entire world"[128].

Original English text

He himself appears as perhaps the most effective agent working towards the disintegration of the original order of things (p413)

Chinese citation

然而，在梳理了诸文明的历史形态与当下面貌后，他作出了与列维-斯特劳斯几乎一样的论断："在世界范围内，文明似乎在许多方面都正在让位于野蛮状态，它导致了一个前所未有的现象，一个全球的'黑暗时代'也许正在降临人类"[129]。

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[126]Lévi-Strauss, *Tristes Tropiques*, p. 541.

[127]列维-斯特劳斯：《忧郁的热带》，543页.

[128]Lévi-Strauss, *Tristes Tropiques*, p. 543.

[129]同上，372页.

English translation of the citation

Still, after sorting out the historical patterns and current features of civilizations, he reached a conclusion that was almost identical to that of Lévi-Strauss: "In a global perspective, civilizations are in many ways seemingly giving way to an uncivilized state of affairs, causing an unprecedented phenomenon, and humanity might descend into a global 'Dark Age'"[130].

Original English text

On a worldwide basis Civilization seems in many respects to be yielding to barbarism, generating the image of an unprecedented phenomenon, a global Dark Age, possibly descending on humanity. (Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, p.321. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

Chinese citation

但在对比研究中一致强调了欧洲文明的特性，并将之于近代人类文明成就归功于欧洲代表的那条"设想中具有例外性质的发展线条"[131]

English translation of the citation

In their works, they all referred to other civilizations, but in their comparative research they would emphasize the characteristics of European civilizations, and they credited that "imaginary line of development with exceptional properties" [132]

Original English text

Supposedly exclusive line of development.

WANG Mingming (王铭铭**)**, professor of anthropology, Peking University. founding editor of Chinese Review of Sociology (2006-2012). His numerous works include *The Supra-Societal Systems* (in Chinese, 2015), *The Historical Dilemma of the 'Sinicization' of a Western Science* (in Chinese, 2005), *Grassroots Charisma: Four Local Leaders in China* (with Stephan Feuchtwang. London: Routledge 2002) and *Culture and Power in the Village Perspective* (in Chinese, 1998).

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[130] *Ibid.*, p. 372.

[131] Jack Goody, *The Theft of History*, p. 9.

[132] Jack Goody, *The Theft of History*, p. 9.