

写作

[中文]

台湾的国家认同影像：台湾原住民青年 如何体验国家认同？¹

罗奕昕

台湾的国家认同问题与其他许多民族多元化地区一样，具有多层次性和内在复杂性。值得注意的是，日本在台湾的殖民时期（1895–1945年）和国民党领导的军事统治时期（1949–1987年）对台湾国家认同的形成和发展产生了重大影响。因此，出现了一大类文献通过不同方面来考量台湾的国家认同，包括国内政策、总统时期、外部影响等。然而，大多数学者都没有具体讨论台湾原住民群体的国家认同主题。台湾的原住民可能只占台湾总人口的不到3%，但是这样做的一个主要后果是抹杀了这些原住民的声音，他们仍在为建立强大的政治代表性和社会存在而奋斗。因此，本研究项目的目标是开启一场关于国家认同的讨论，而且讨论的核心就是台湾代表性不足的原住民群体。

作为一个概念，国家认同可以解释为对“我们/我们”群体的一种心理依恋，这种依恋是由社会和政治构建的。² 随着时间的推移，这种认同会因“社会化机制”的影响而改变，“社会化机制”包括语言、文化、对共享历史的诠释等。³ 这种特别的“台湾人”认同（相对于军事统治时期实施的“中国人”认同）最初是在李登辉和陈水扁担任总统期间（分别为

¹ 本文是作者罗奕昕 (Josephina Georgopoulou) 于 2023 年 4 月撰写的本科毕业论文原文摘要。作者来稿时说明该文代表其当时的中文写作水平，本刊主编没做修改，欢迎读者反馈。

² Chu, 'Taiwan's Identity Politics'; Fukuyama, 'Identity'.

³ Wang, 'The Taiwan Voter'; Fukuyama, 'Identity'.

1996-2000 年和 2000-2008 年) 建立和加强的。¹ 这方面的证据通常基于国立政治大学选举研究中心每年进行的民意调查，特别是中心关于“台湾民众台湾热/中国人认同趋势分”和“台湾民众统独立场趋势分布”的民意调查。本文撰写时的最新数据显示，民众对认同的意见分布如下：台湾人，60.8%；台湾人和中国人，32.9%；中国人，3.6%。² 此外，在统独问题上最受欢迎的三种立场如下：维持现状，日后再决定，28.7%；无限期维持现状，28.5%；维持现状，走向独立，25.4%。³

由于时间和资源的限制，本研究仅对台湾原住民大学生进行了四次半结构式访谈。因此，虽然这些数据不能一概而论，但可以作为拓展这一领域研究的重要起点。首先，访谈的初步结果表明，台湾原住民社区非常重视各自的部落文化，包括其语言和传统习俗。受访者还一致认为，教育系统及其结构的缺陷阻碍了原住民社区保留其文化。受访者对民进党和国民党均持批评态度，他们进一步强调，台湾原住民与汉族台湾人之间的分裂依然存在。在对访谈进行详细分析后，研究进一步证实，有两种形式的教育可以建立国家认同：正规教育（机构教育）和非正规教育（参与文化和传统部落习俗）。此外，台湾原住民与汉族之间的经济差距直接阻碍了生活在台湾农村地区的原住民社区获得高质量的教育。由此可见，经济差距进一步加深了台湾原住民与汉族之间的隔阂。然而，面对中国日益增长的经济和政治实力，台湾原住民青年将对国家（台湾人）的认同置于自身民族认同之上，这表明“中国”因素可能成为巩固强大的“台湾人”认同的催化剂。

总括而言，虽然原住民的族群认同被预期设置在台湾的国家认同中，但台湾的原住民青年在某种程度上同时以原住民作为他们的族群与文化认同，并以台湾人作为他们的政治认同。因此，台湾原住民青年可以流动地体验国家认同，因为他们的认同可以同时是种族（原住民）、文化（原住民或台湾人）和政治（台湾人），也可以在不同的时间点上种族（原住民）、文化（原住民或台湾人）和政治（台湾人）。进一步的研究可以更深入地关注导致从一种认同向另一种认同转变的不同因素，包括经济因素、

¹ See authors such as Corcuff, 'Taiwan's Mainlanders'; Ho, 'Crafting the Taiwanese'; Hughes, 'Negotiation National Identity in Taiwan'; Marsh, 'National Identity and Ethnicity in Taiwan'.

² Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, *Taiwanese / Chinese Identity*.

³ Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, *Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland*.

教育政策和实施，以及中国在国际秩序中的发展地位。

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罗奕昕 (Josephina Georgopoulou) 女士，伦敦大学亚非学院 (SOAS) 中文与政治学学士。她获得了燕京学堂奖学金，并于2023年在北京大学燕京学堂攻读中国学法律硕士（政治与国际关系）。她致力于政策分析和发展方面的职业生涯，同时在北京的当地组织做志愿者，帮助改善社区的教育水平。她曾在2023年第四届社会公益与商务创新中文大赛决赛中获得了参与奖。

[参考英文]

Imaging national identity in Taiwan: how do Taiwan's indigenous youth experience national identity?¹

Josephina Georgopoulou

The issue of national identity in Taiwan, as in many other ethnically diverse regions, is multi-layered and inherently complex. Notably, Japan's colonial period in Taiwan (1895-1945) and the KMT-led military rule (1949-1987) have had significant consequences for the formation and development of national identity in Taiwan. Thus, a large category of literature has emerged that examines national identity in Taiwan through one of many lenses, including domestic policy, presidential time periods, external influence and more. However, most scholars fail to address national identity amongst Taiwan's indigenous groups specifically, who make up less than 3% of the entire Taiwanese population. A key consequence of this is that this erases the voices of such communities, who continue to struggle to establish strong political representation and social presence. As a result, the objective of this research project was to open a conversation on national identity centred around the voices of Taiwan's underrepresented indigenous communities.

As a concept, national identity can be explained as a psychological attachment to a 'we/us' group which has been socially and politically constructed.² This can change over time through the influence of 'socialisation mechanisms', which target language, culture, interpretation of a shared history and more.³ A distinct 'Taiwanese' identity (as opposed to the 'Chinese' identity implemented during military rule) was initially built and strengthened during the Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian presidencies (1996-2000 and 2000-2008, respectively).⁴ Evidence of this is often based on annual survey polls conducted by the National Chengchi University Election Study Center, specifically their polls on 'Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese'

¹ This is a summary of the original undergraduate dissertation the author wrote in April 2023.

² Chu, "Taiwan's Identity Politics"; Fukuyama, "Identity".

³ Wang, "The Taiwan Voter"; Fukuyama, "Identity".

⁴ See authors such as Corcuff, "Taiwan's Mainlanders"; Ho, "Crafting the Taiwanese"; Hughes, "Negotiation National Identity in Taiwan"; Marsh, "National Identity and Ethnicity in Taiwan".

and ‘Changes in the Unification-Independence Stances of Taiwanese’. The most recent data at time of writing shows the distribution of the population’s opinion on identity as follows: Taiwanese, 60.8%; Taiwanese and Chinese, 32.9%; Chinese, 3.6%.¹ Further the three most popular stances on the unification-independence issue are as follows: maintain status quo, decide at a later date, 28.7%; maintain status quo indefinitely, 28.5%; maintain status quo, move toward independence, 25.4%.²

Due to time and resource constraints, the research was limited to only four semi-structured interviews with ethnically indigenous Taiwanese university students. Therefore, although the data cannot be generalised, it serves as a significant starting point to expanding research in this field. Firstly, the initial findings from the interviews demonstrated that Taiwan’s indigenous communities greatly value their individual tribal culture, including its language and traditional practises. There was also agreement across the interviewees that flaws in the education system and its structure were preventing indigenous communities from retaining their culture. Critical of both the DPP and the KMT, the interviewees further emphasised anecdotally that divisions between indigenous Taiwanese and ethnically Han Chinese Taiwanese continue to exist. Following detailed analysis of the interviews, the research further confirmed that there exist two forms of education which can build national identity: formal (institutional) and informal (participation in cultural and traditional tribal practises). Furthermore, the economic disparity between indigenous and Han Chinese Taiwanese is directly preventing indigenous communities living in Taiwan’s rural areas from accessing high-quality education. By implication, economic disparity is further deepening the divide between indigenous and Han Chinese Taiwanese. However, in reaction to China’s growing economic and political strength, Taiwan’s indigenous youth prioritise identity with the state (Taiwanese) over their own ethnic identity, demonstrating how the ‘China’ factor may be acting as a catalyst for consolidating a strong ‘Taiwanese’ identity.

In conclusion, although it is expected that the Indigenous ethnic identity is set within a Taiwanese national identity, Taiwan’s indigenous youth have, to a certain extent, adopted Indigenous as both their ethnic and cultural identity, and Taiwanese as their political identity. Therefore, Taiwan’s indigenous youth can experience national identity fluidly, as their identity can be ethnic (Indigenous), cultural (Indigenous or Taiwanese) and political (Taiwanese) all at once or at separate moments in time. Further research could focus more deeply on separate factors that cause a shift from one identity to another, including economic factors, education policies and implementation, and China’s developing position in the international order.

¹ Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, ‘Taiwanese / Chinese Identity’.

² Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, ‘Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland.’